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ABSTRACT 
 Great power competition is the underlying concept regarding the National 
Security Strategy of the United States in 2019. With a litany of publications, ideas, and 
qualitative explanations of a global super power, the United States, and a rising regional 
hegemony, the People’s Republic of China, is it possible to quantitatively understand the 
behavior of the competition for global superiority? The system model created for this 
thesis represents a dichotomous system where the China-Pakistan alliance is the 
opposition against the U.S.-India alliance. Therefore, the structure of our research 
involves the pairing of a great power with a regional power to form an alliance, where 
they are in competition against another alliance of the same components. This project 
develops a broad framework for understanding the complexities of great power 
competition, power transition theory, the study of alliance formation and behavior, and 
the interactions between great powers and regional allies. Our research seeks to use 
system dynamics to explain the parity of prosperity and security between Pakistan and 
India in the context of great power competition. 
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A. INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
In 2017, the U.S. published a National Security Strategy (NSS) that reenergizes 
great power competition (GPC) with China and Russia, challenging their revisionism and 
global influence that threaten American interests abroad. Also, it mentions the threats that 
China and Russia present to American security and prosperity.1 While each of these great 
powers and their regional allies has different priorities and interests in Eurasia, 
policymakers suggest that a strengthening alliance between the U.S. and India is underway 
that has the potential to alter the competitive structure and balance of geopolitical power 
with neighboring states. For instance, the 2017 NSS explicitly asserts that the U.S. 
welcomes “India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense 
partner” and that it will “encourage the economic integration of Central and South Asia to 
promote prosperity and economic linkages that will bolster connectivity and trade.”2 
Starting in 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated various foreign 
infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that have the potential to 
expand its strategic influence in key areas vital to U.S. interests. The BRI presents the 
inherent risk of compromising U.S. interests by using debt to gain a strategic concession 
from economically vulnerable nations. Understanding the methodology behind Chinese 
geo-economic expansion will provide situational awareness to senior defense officials, 
diplomats, economists, and policymakers. The BRI is a modern-day economic alliance, 
and the rise of the Chinese trading state is on track to become a global superpower. 
The BRI represents a cornerstone strategy of the CCP’s strategy for global 
revisionism that undermines U.S. policy objectives and seeks to rebalance the strategic 
alignment of its neighbors in the process. Furthermore, the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project for the PRC’s greater Belt Road Initiative and will 
                                                 
1 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017), 2. 
2 White House, 46, 50. 
2 
be the first corridor to be fully operational, tentatively slated for completion by 2030. This 
bilateral corridor has the potential to generate increased Chinese leverage over Pakistan, to 
increase access and security for China’s market and energy requirements, and as a result, 
to raise concerns among the U.S., India, and other regional neighbors.  
Because of the size and scope of the BRI, we selected CPEC as an entry point into 
our research. We recognize the long history between Pakistan and India as well as 
fluctuating levels of influence from the United States and China in the south Asia region. 
The shaping of this regional dichotomy extends to reference great power competition. 
B. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
By gaining a better understanding of prosperity and security differences between 
Pakistan and India, our research sought to make policy and strategy contributions towards 
the broader competition playing out between the U.S. and China. Analyzing the parity of 
prosperity and security between Pakistan and India may provide insights to better inform 
future U.S. policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. To quantify the elements of 
geopolitical power, we reference a report from the Henry Jackson Society titled Audit of 
Geopolitical Capability: An Assessment of Twenty Major Powers. “Much of the post-
Second World War settlements and the institutions which emerged from it are being 
challenged; from NATO to the BRICS countries, the dynamics and challenges of this new 
world order require us to understand how geopolitical capabilities are shaped.” 3 
Understanding shifts in the world order is important for policymakers because now is the 
opportune time to bridge knowledge and action. Referring to knowledge and action, 
George Alexander writes in his book Bridging the Gap, “Faulty images of each are source 
misperceptions and miscalculations that have often led to major errors in policy, avoidable 
catastrophes, and missed opportunities.”4 In a renewed era of great power competition, it 
is imperative to understand strategic competitors. 
                                                 
3 James Rogers, Audit of Geopolitical Capability Report: An Assessment of Twenty Major Powers 
(London; Henry Jackson Society, 2019), 9. https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
HJS-2019-Audit-of-Geopolitical-Capability-Report-web.pdf. 
4 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: An Assessment Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy 
(Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 126. 
3 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This research aims to use system dynamics to explore the parity of prosperity and 
security between Pakistan and India in the context of great power competition. The reason 
we chose system dynamics to explain the parity between Pakistan and India was that it 
allows us to model the structure of a complex system and to make changes that stimulate 
potential changes to foreign policy.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can we use system dynamics modeling to enhance our understanding of the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The system model created for this thesis represents a dichotomous system where the 
China-Pakistan alliance is the opposition against the U.S.-Indian alliance. Therefore, the 
foundational structure of our research involves the pairing of two great powers with two 
regional powers to form alliances in competition. Throughout our research, we found concepts 
that fundamentally shaped our understanding of the problem and have helped us navigate the 
various complexities of studying the behavior of a multi-national system of interactions. In 
order to best contextualize our model’s depiction of the regional geopolitics of South Asia, 
this literature review develops a broad framework for understanding the complexities of great 
power competition (GPC), power transition theory, the study of Alliance formation and 
behavior, and the interactions between great powers and regional allies. 
A. GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND POWER TRANSITION THEORY 
The direct rhetoric expressed in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), referring 
to China as a rising revisionist power and competitive threat, was formative for our 
understanding of how U.S. policymakers have undergone a strategic shift in contemporary 
thoughts and perceptions towards China.5 Our research suggests that great power competition 
is underpinned by national power derived from a variety of sources, but we acknowledge that 
“power” is derived from the blended economic and military prowess of states.6 Along similar 
lines, In The Rise and Fall Of The Great Powers, Paul Kennedy describes this fundamental 
linkage when he explains, “so far as the international system is concerned, wealth and power, 
or economic strength and military strength, are always relative and should be seen as such. 
Since they are relative, and since all societies are subject to the inexorable tendency to change, 
then the international balances can never be still, and it is a folly of statesmanship to assume 
                                                 
5 White House, 25. 
6 Brian Efird, Jacek Kugler, and Gaspare Genna, “From War to Integration: Generalizing Power 
Transition Theory,” International Interactions 29, no. 4 (October 2010); 300, https://doi.org/10.1080/
714950654.  
6 
that they ever would be.” 7  Our literature review illuminates the relationship between 
economic and military capabilities, which our thesis broadly categorizes in terms of prosperity 
and security. Scholars consistently identify the nexus between security and prosperity, in 
which each of these sources of national power has the potential to reinforce or enable the 
development of the other. In South Asia, it will be in the best interests of China and the U.S. 
to steer regional geopolitics in ways that are favorable towards and cognizant of this 
fundamental relationship between economic and military capabilities. 
The central concept of power transition, or hegemonic cycles, is a layer of the 
structural theory that analyzes the interaction between great powers and how these 
relationships ultimately determine the status quo for the rest of the international community. 
In Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and The International System, John Arquilla 
investigates why the most frequent losers in warfare are the initiators found in the great power 
category. He describes how the order of the international system under transitionalism is 
“provided by leaders who either prevent new challenges or build coalitions to overcome 
them.”8 In other words, he recognizes that great powers are compelled into conflicts to 
preserve the status quo and to prevent disruptions created by challengers, and powerful states 
are often obligated to do so even after the outcomes of similar, previous conflicts have proven 
to be unsuccessful. Similarly, Hegemonic Stability Theory recognizes the stabilizing role of 
dominant power in the international system, and it also recognizes how alliances surrounding 
both the existing hegemon and the upcoming challenger play an integral in shaping these 
interactions and their behavioral outcomes.9 
For all of its contributions, Hegemonic Stability Theory is not without its share of 
criticism. While analyzing the theory’s shortcomings, Duncan Snidal captures some of Robert 
Keohane’s perspectives by mentioning how Keohane “recognizes that hegemony may involve 
constraints on subordinate members of the regime and exploit nonmembers,” Snidal goes on 
                                                 
7 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 536.  
8 John Arquilla, Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, DC: 
Crane Russak, 1992), 42. 
9 George Modelski, “Long-Term Trends in World Politics,” Journal of World-Systems Research 11, 
no. 2 (2005): 199, https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2005.387. 
7 
to explain that, “It does not alter a basic view of hegemonic cooperation in which hegemonic 
leadership works to the advantage of other states as well as to the advantage of the 
hegemon.”10 Said differently, Snidal suggests that a system stabilized by a hegemon will 
inherently continue to benefit the hegemon and its alliance network more so than other actors 
in the system, which may lead to an exaggerated, skewed, or false sense of system stability. 
These concepts are relevant to our thesis research because the overarching 
international system in the current era of great power competition features the hegemonic 
United States interacting with a rising challenger in China. We suspect that this competition 
among great powers will manifest itself globally and will employ all instruments of national 
power (economic, military, diplomatic, and informational) in concert against one another. Our 
thesis contends that the intense competition between China and the U.S. will increasingly 
involve Pakistan and India as significant actors in the future, and this is precisely why our 
system model seeks to illuminate the interactions and subsequent behavior of these actors as 
competition is underway. 
B. THE STUDY OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AND BEHAVIOR 
Another area of literature that enhances our analysis of great power competition deals 
with theorists who analyze alliance formation and disintegration. Our literature review 
suggests that the relationship between China and Pakistan can have different interpretations 
depending on the perspective of the observer. When does a partnership become considered an 
alliance? How do economic interdependencies transform into binding security arrangements? 
How does the international community quantify the strength of interstate relationships? While 
the complexities surrounding these questions are many, our literature review provides some 
perspectives that further guided our research as it relates to codifying alliance networks within 
our system model. 
In Origins Of Alliances, Stephen Walt defines an alliance as merely, “a formal or 
informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”11 
                                                 
10 Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39, no. 4 
(1985): 586, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830002703X. 
11 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 12. 
8 
Conversely, in Alliance Politics, Glenn Snyder focuses exclusively on military alliances, and 
he identifies how the cost-benefit analysis of alliances tends to favor those with more 
significant mutual interests, “often precipitated by specific threatening events.”12 Regardless 
of what constitutes an “alliance” between states, our literature review illustrates that the 
perceived relationship is just as important, if not more important, than the actual relationship 
between actors. Stephen Walt suggests that a “Balance of Threat” posturing by neighboring 
states is most applicable when certain thresholds are being met in the following areas: 
aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions.13 This is relevant because 
our system model demonstrates that all of Walt’s threat balancing criteria are present in the 
volatile rivalry between India and Pakistan, which we will further analyze later in this paper. 
A portion of our literature review describes how interstate relationships during 
peacetime could indeed have significant roles in their wartime disposition. Snyder describes 
two tendencies involving inter-state alliance networks that can serve as valuable indicators for 
future regional stability, which he refers to as “integrative and insecurity spirals.” 14 
Integrative spirals bring existing alliances closer together and insecurity spirals perpetuate 
themselves on the fear of adversarial motives, both of which are “mutually generating and 
reinforcing” as portrayed in Europe prior to World War I.15 This thesis seeks to model the 
feedback mechanisms among some of these spirals, and then to observe the behavioral 
outcomes of our simulation, that have the potential to increase the odds of conflict or reinforce 
the mutual alignment of the actors involved. Similarly, while extracting lessons learned from 
coalition warfare in World War I, another scholar draws on the distinct advantages that states 
can attain from transforming peacetime relationships into wartime alliances. Grieco opines 
that “If the First World War tells us anything, it is that coalitions with preexisting networks of 
professional contacts, institutional mechanisms for common planning, methods for intra-
                                                 
12 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 144. 
13 Walt, The Origins of Alliance, 12. 
14 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 339. 
15 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 339. 
9 
allied learning, and consultative command cultures have the advantage in battle.” 16 
Therefore, the duality of the China-Pakistan relationship (both an economic connection during 
peacetime and a military supply chain, or a potential collective defense relationship in 
wartime) can arouse the fears of insecurity among India, the U.S., and their regional allies. 
C. INTERACTIONS OF GREAT POWERS 
Studying alliance formation can also inform us of predictive relationships between 
superpowers and regional actors because these pairings can often identify a state’s underlying 
motive. One of the more interesting, yet alarming, aspects of the China-Pakistan relationship 
will be India’s perception and reactions to it. Does Pakistan moving closer to China represent 
more of a threat to India? How threatening does China’s economic extension into the Indian 
Ocean appear to be for India or the U.S.? Walt contends that regional actors have a foremost 
propensity to balance against other regional actors or rivals as their most important initiative, 
and any balancing against a global superpower is more of secondary concern. As Walt 
summarizes this behavior, “the differing perspectives of regional states and the superpowers 
help explain why persistent regional conflicts have undermined each superpower’s efforts to 
enlist regional allies in a crusade against the other superpower.”17 A prime example of this 
global-regional power interplay was evident when the U.S. originally intended to leverage 
China as a Eurasian counterbalance to Russia during the Cold War, but 50 years later, China 
has developed into one of the premier threats to U.S. national interests.18 
Since India shares contiguous borders with Pakistan and China, policymakers could 
advocate for a deepening U.S.-India Alliance based on threat balancing alone. India by itself 
represents a peculiar case of power categorization. With a large military, large population, 
successful space program, and enormous economic potential, India seems to fall somewhere 
                                                 
16 Kelly A. Grieco, “Fighting and Learning in the Great War: Four Lessons in Coalition Warfare,” 
Parameters 48, no. 3 (2018): 35, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/eec0/
0e119cf0d12a2638aeecdbca2fc78cfbd2af.pdf. 
17 Walt,  The Origins of Alliance, 161. 
18 Gary Schmitt. The China Dream: America’s, China’s, and the Resulting Competition (Washington, 
DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2019), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The-China-
Dream.pdf. 
10 
in between a regional power and a great power, which may be why the National Security 
Strategy refers to India’s “emergence as a leading global power.”19 
D. GEO-STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH ASIA 
The literature review illustrates that there are several projections of future prosperity 
trends that will continue to increase complexity and competition in South Asia, making it a 
crucial region for the future of great power competition. for example, the Indo-Pacific region 
is home to 10 of the 20 fastest-growing economies, contains over a third of global GDP, 
represents 60% of global GDP growth, and will account for 87% of the next billion middle-
class entrants. 20  In May 2018, the U.S. officially renamed the Geographic Combatant 
Command (GCC) that is responsible for this region from Pacific Command (PACOM) to 
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The new designation for this theater of operations 
symbolizes not only its potential future to facilitate India’s rise to a more prominent role as a 
regional stakeholder (as suggested in the National Security Strategy), but also demonstrates 
that the linkages between the Pacific and Indian Oceans are becoming more crucial in terms 
of regional prosperity and security. 
In describing the strategic vitality of the Indian Ocean region, Ward states that “the 
Indo-Pacific is a region that combines two of the world’s great oceans-the Indian and the 
Pacific-and the chokepoint-riddled jugular of world trade and global economics.”21 The 
culmination point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) at the deep water port of 
Gwadar is a concerning for India, the U.S., and its allies because it could pave the way to 
more encroachment by the Chinese Navy in the upcoming decades. 
Accompanying all the strategic opportunities in and surrounding South Asia, there are 
also considerable risks to regional actors and the international community at large. The India-
Pakistan rivalry is one of the most volatile interstate relationships that exist in the world 
                                                 
19 White House, 46. 
20 Phil Davidson, “Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 
2, no. 1 (2019): 3. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02_Issue-1/
Spring%202019.pdf. 
21 Jonathan Ward, China’s Vision of Victory. (New York: Atlas Publishing and Media Company, 
2019), 166. 
11 
today.22 Both nations have a longstanding history of conflict and are continually navigating 
a high tension relationship resulting from an array of flashpoints, such as: accusing one 
another of state-sponsored terrorism, border clashes, and the disparate perspectives on the 
sovereignty of Kashmir. Moreover, the fact that both nations have nuclear arsenals make this 
rivalry particularly dangerous. One of our underlying assumptions while observing the 
behavioral outcomes of our system model is that despite intense competition between the U.S. 
and China, neither side can currently benefit from, nor is in favor of, a war between India and 
Pakistan. 
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is a U.S. strategic response to rising Chinese 
power and influence in the theater. A term that has undergone development and morphing 
since 2016, FOIP is the most current, overarching strategy and policy alignment that conveys 
the U.S. approach in the region. Some of the critical features of FOIP include the emphasis 
on transparency, the rule of law, eliminating coercion, and ensuring freedom of navigation so 
that all nations have access to the abundant economic prosperity offered by the region.23 The 
concept of FOIP has been referenced by other nations, such as Japan, India, and Australia, 
illustrating that its agenda has multi-lateral appeal and is not a unilateral effort on behalf of 
the U.S. Aside from seeking to advance global prosperity, the U.S. and some of its allies have 
also driven towards new developments in the security domain that can complement the 
economic and diplomatic dimensions of FOIP. For instance, the Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue (known as the “Quad”) has been in development between the U.S., India, Japan, and 
Australia since 2017. 24  Although it has not become a formal security arrangement, it 
nonetheless shows a collaborative grouping of like-minded nations that could be the genesis 
of future security dialogues. Given our research topic, it is worth noting that neither Pakistan 
                                                 
22 Thazha V. Paul, “Why Has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and 
an Intractable Conflict,” Security Studies 15, no. 4 (2006), 600. 
23 Ryosuke Hanada, “ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-Pacific: Rules-based Order and Regional Integrity,” 
Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, no. 19 (2019): 12. 
https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2597221/
GMF+FOIP+Asia+Report.pdf?sequence=2. 
24 John Hemmings, Infrastructure, Ideas, and Strategy in the Indo-Pacific (London, England: Henry 
Jackson Society, 2019), 12, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/infrastructure-ideas-and-strategy-
in-the-indo-pacific/. 
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nor China, contributed to the development of the FOIP, or the Quad. The Quad dialogues are 
intended to promote the preservation of regional security and prosperity, but our literature 
review revealed that the four-nation forum has increasingly focused on securing national 
interests in the region in response to China’s growing military presence and capabilities.25 
India is expected to surpass China as the most populous nation this century, and its 
national energy demands are increasing exponentially, and the growth of its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is expected to make India the second-largest economy (in purchasing power 
parity) in the world by 2050. 26  However, India’s emergence this century is rife with 
challenges. Despite its large population, India also has large pockets of rural populations that 
are without electricity and are not well integrated into their domestic economy. Our literature 
review emphasized that India’s flooding, rural governance, and other vulnerabilities related 
to pollution and climate change, are much more significant challenges to their national growth 
than other sociopolitical challenges (such as the Caste System of their society). 
Terrorism throughout India is a constant concern for Indian politicians, and achieving 
stability requires resources that come with opportunity costs tied to other much-needed 
demands for their growing nation. Overall, foreign and domestic pressures such as these will 
continue to challenge the Indian government in both security and prosperity domains in the 
decades to come. Eventually, they may be forced to deviate from their historic policies of 
nonalignment and strategic autonomy in order to attain their national interests.27 
Pakistan struggles with domestic terrorism with insurgencies in neighboring 
Afghanistan as well as Baluchistan, which is home to a large portion of CPEC infrastructure 
                                                 
25 Sameer Lalwani, “Reluctant Link? India, the Quad, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” Mind the 
Gap: National Views of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, no. 19 (2019): 33, https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-
xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2597221/GMF+FOIP+Asia+Report.pdf?sequence=2. 
26 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India as a Challenge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Asia Policy 14, no. 
2 (2019), 27, https://www.nbr.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/publications/
asiapolicy142_where_the_belt_meets_the_road_rt_apr2019.pdf. 
27 Shivshankar Menon, Choices : Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2016), 132. 
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and traffic.28 Pakistan’s economic turmoil is substantial and is not expected to be immediately 
resolved by any degree of funding or infrastructure development from China. Perhaps the 
most fundamental challenge to Pakistan, as well as its allies, is the heightened role that its 
military plays in its politics. Pakistan’s military influence over its foreign policy is seen by 
many as a source for sustaining an intense rivalry with India, and it constrains the ability of 
Pakistani politicians to drive reforms that are not aligned with the interests of its military 
leaders.29  
The geostrategic value that Pakistan provides China is evident, and our model seeks 
to emphasize how this can play an expanded role in the future of great power competition. 
Pakistan provides China with an alternative access corridor that alleviates their shipping, 
economic, and energy vulnerabilities due to the strategic chokepoint in the Strait of 
Malacca,30 which is considered a key Sea Lane of Communication in any future conflicts 
with the U.S. When taken together, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the 
“String of Pearls” theory in the Indian Ocean heighten suspicions that China could eventually 
militarize the Pakistani port of Gwadar.31 It is a concern that CPEC, which is a purely 
economic partnership, could develop into a regional security flashpoint. 
1. Closed-Source Data-Fragile States Index 
A nonpartisan, non-profit education organization, The Fund for Peace began 
collecting quantitative and qualitative data in 2006 and has produced an index value for 178 
countries annually, known as The Fragile States Index (FSI).32 FSI scoring uses twelve 
                                                 
28 Jeremy Garlick, “Deconstructing the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pipe Dreams Versus 
Geopolitical realities,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 112 (2018): 525, https://doi.org/10.1080/
10670564.2018.1433483. 
29 Frederic Grare, “India–Pakistan Relations: Does Modi Matter?.” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 
4 (2014): 102, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002158. 
30 Faisal Pervaiz, Why the Belt and Road Fuels India’s Fears of Encirclement (Austin, TX: 
STRATFOR,2019) https://www.stratfor.com/api/v3/pdf/299276. 
31 Virginia Marantidou, “Revisiting China’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy: Places ‘With Chinese 
Characteristics’ and Their Security Implications,” Issues and Insights 14, no. 7 (2014): 26, 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182061/140624_issuesinsights_vol14no7.pdf. 
32 Fragile States Index Methodology and CAST Framework (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2017), 
4, https://fragilestatesindex.org/2017/05/13/fragile-states-index-and-cast-framework-methodology/. 
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indicators to assess the degree of fragility of a state, where a higher score represents a higher 
level of fragility. The intent is to evaluate patterns and trends that enable decision-makers to 
implement effective policies. 
The Fund for Peace created a “Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST),” which is 
their primary mechanism for generating their fragility assessments.33  This methodology 
combines a variety of quantitative and qualitative factors in order to make assessments for a 
state’s level of fragility. While the CAST methodology is patented, our research team 
attempted to disaggregate the Fragile State Index (FSI) to inform our system dynamics 
modeling. 
Each variable on the index produces a value between 0–10, where the closer the value 
is to zero, the less fragile the state, and a summation of the values gives a maximum score of 
120. The range of data used in our model starts in 2006 and ends in 2018. Of the 12 variables, 
four categories that helped distinguish the conflict risk indicators of a fragile state were 1) 
Cohesion, 2) Economic, 3) Political, and 4) Social and cross-cutting indicators.34 Figure 1 
represents the categorization of the variables and the naming convention used throughout this 
thesis. 
 
Figure 1. FSI Overview35 
The FSI variables and their associated data are present throughout our model. We 
discovered throughout our research that each FSI variable has a series of questions and a scale 
                                                 
33 Fragile States Index Methodology and CAST Framework, 4. 
34 “Fragile State Index Indicators,” Fund for Peace, Jun 1, 2019 https://fragilestatesindex.org/
indicators/. 
35 Fund for Peace. 
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associated with the point rating to help the consumer understand the context of each variable. 
These descriptions provided for each variable help us further contextualize the fragility scores, 
ranging from 0–10. For example, the explanation in Figure 2 illustrates the definition of the 
variable, associated questions, and scaled values for the security apparatus variable, 𝐶𝐶1.36  
 
Figure 2. Security Apparatus Scaled Values37 
2. Open-Source Data 
In order to provide more credibility for our model, we integrated control variables 
from reputable data sources. For instance, our model included the gross domestic product 
(GDP), the percentage growth of GDP, the Polity Index, Imports, Defense Spending, defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP, and population growth of each country. 
(1) Gross Domestic Product 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used in our model because its value is an 
international norm, as well as a reliable indicator of prosperity. Tim Callen describes the 
                                                 
36 Conflict Assessment Framework Manual (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2014),14. 
37 Source: Conflict Assessment Framework Manual (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2014),14. 
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important role that GDP serves in assessing a nation’s level of overall prosperity because it 
generally “gives information about the size of the economy and how an economy is 
performing.”38 
(2) Growth Percentage 
GDP was insufficient by itself, and we selected GDP growth percentage as the means 
to better understand the impact of GDP on prosperity. It also helps explain trends, growth, 
and correlations to foreign direct investment or influx of capital. 
(3) Polity 
The polity data series attempts to measure the political stability of a government by 
identifying where it places on a spectrum between democratic and authoritative governance 
tendencies. According to the Center for Systemic Peace, “The Polity conceptual scheme is 
unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions, rather than discrete and mutually exclusive forms of governance.”39 
The polity score ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 is an autocracy, and 10 is a democracy. Our 
data set ranges from 2006 to 2017. The polity index has value when considered to be part of 
growth and defense because of the effects of government decision making on those processes. 
(4) Imports 
Imports are goods and services (merchandise trade) entering a country’s economic 
territory that adds to its stock of material resources.40 We assess that the more a country 
imports, generally speaking, the more a country is reliant on another country and has favorable 
connectivity to the rest of the world economy. In a relational context to our model, as imports 
increase, prosperity increases.  
                                                 
38 Tim Callan, “Gross Domestic Product: An Economy’s All,” International Monetary Fund, last 
modified December 18, 2018, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm. 
39 “The Polity Project,” Center for Systemic Peace, June 1, 2019, http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polityproject.html. 
40 “Imports of Goods and Services,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, June 
1, 2019, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1300. 
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(5) Defense Spending 
The data set for defense spending came from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). It shows the defense spending for every country and is also broken 
down by regions in the world. Defense spending is an essential factor to consider when 
analyzing the security of a country. In SIPRI’s global analysis, they concluded, “Military 
expenditure in Asia and Oceania has risen every year since 1988. At $507 billion, military 
spending in the region accounted for 28 percent of the global total in 2018, compared with 
just 9.0 percent in 1988.”41  
(6) Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP 
Defense spending as a percentage of GDP is an indication of how highly a country 
prioritizes security. This value is particularly revealing for our model considering the 
disparities between India and Pakistan that exist, for instance, in population sizes and sizes of 
nuclear arsenals. 
(7) Population 
“Over 228,000 people are added to the world’s population every day—each needs 
sufficient land, water, shelter, food, and energy to survive.”42 In our system model, the 
population plays a role in comparing relative prosperity and security between Pakistan and 
India. 
  
                                                 
41 “World Military Expenditure Grows $1.8 Trillion in 2018,” Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, April 29, 201, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/world-military-
expenditure-grows-18-trillion-2018. 
42 “PMC Works to Stabilize Global Population,” Population Media Center, June 1, 2019, 
https://www.populationmedia.org/issue/population-growth/. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This research uses system dynamics to better understand the effects of a gap in 
parity of prosperity and security between Pakistan and India in the context of great power 
competition. the reason we chose system dynamics to explore the parity between Pakistan 
and India was that it allows us to understand the non-linear behavioral outcomes of a 
complex system and to identify leverage points in the system that would be relevant areas 
to introduce potential changes in foreign policy. 
First, we explain the structure and utility of system dynamics, the building of causal 
loop diagrams, and associated polarity logic. We describe the model in terms of stock and 
flow diagrams. We then identify the boundaries of the system and its limitations. Once 
these steps are complete, we explain the equations and the behavior of the model (ref 
Appendix A), and explain the development and integration of R-Coding used in the model 
(ref Appendix B). 
Second, we explain the model, termed the Baseline Model, using historical and 
forecasted data (ref Appendix A). This sets conditions to explain the importance of the 
parity of prosperity and security between Pakistan and India based on the Fragile States 
Index. Next, we explain and integrate adjustments to the model (ref Appendix A), termed 
Adjusted Model, intended to reflect behavioral outcomes in the context of great power 
competition and our literature review. 
Lastly, we use the outcomes from the Baseline Model, and Adjusted Model and 
subsequently make recommendations for U.S. policy to enhance India’s prosperity and 
security and for future research. 
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IV. MODEL ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the data collection and quantitative methods utilized to build 
the system dynamics model of India-Pakistan Prosperity and Security Parity based upon 
fragility indices. Because of the complexity of the system itself, we constrain the area of 
South Asia to two regional actors; India and Pakistan. To even further narrow the problem, 
we limit the division of each country into only two parts (or stocks), prosperity, and 
security. The model uses data inputs that flow from convertors into these stocks to calculate 
the level of prosperity and security each year. The model then calculates a perception of 
rival’s prosperity and security for each country, which then feeds back into the inflows of 
the original stocks. 
A. SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
Jay Forrester developed system dynamics in the 1950s at MIT, and it has since been 
utilized in a wide variety of fields such as Engineering, Physics, Psychology, Biology, 
Linguistics, and more.43 The complexity of reality is challenging to simplify into the 
straightforward cause and effect relationships (linear relationships) because there are often 
unknown interactions and outcomes within a system that contribute to unpredictable 
system behavior. The complexity of various interactions and information delays between 
components within (and outside) of a system can create a situation where observations of 
behavior only tell a portion of the story, and the system exhibits nonlinear tendencies. What 
constitutes a system? Donella Meadows describes how every system is composed of 
elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose; however, she also emphasizes that 
the overall behavior of any system is much more strongly affected by the interconnections 
(relationships, feedback mechanisms) than they are by the individual elements.44  
At its most fundamental level, System Dynamics emphasizes the non-linear 
interactions and feedback that take place within a system. John Sterman, a System 
                                                 
43 John Sterman. Business Dynamics (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), 4.  
44 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea 
Green Publishing, 2008), 12. 
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Dynamics expert, describes, “Much of the art of system dynamics modeling is discovering 
and representing the feedback processes, which, along with stock and flow structures, time 
delays, and nonlinearities, determine the dynamics of a system. There is an immense range 
of different feedback processes and other structures to be mastered before one can 
understand the dynamics of complex systems.”45 Feedback is critical to manipulating 
change in any system because a system without feedback would lack complexity and 
remain static. The two primary types of feedback in System Dynamics are positive (which 
action by the independent variable results in the same, or reinforcing, action by the 
dependent variable beyond what it otherwise would have been) or negative (in which action 
by the independent variable results in opposite, or balancing, action by the dependent 
variable beyond what it otherwise would have been). As one can imagine, accounting for 
and representing the various feedback processes within any system are complicated 
undertakings, however, if one can accomplish a better understanding of these feedbacks 
within any system, they will then have a much more comprehensive understanding of the 
system and its behavior as a whole. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, our research acknowledges that there is an interaction 
with some degree of feedback between a nation’s prosperity and security. Because there is 
a multitude of other positive and negative feedback loops between the two domains, the 
behavior of the nation competing to maximize its security and prosperity is more dynamic 
than it may initially seem. When applying System Dynamics to policy and strategy 
development, it is essential to note that System Dynamics is not a predictive methodology. 
When illustrating the value of System Dynamics in policy planning, Wayne Porter 
summarizes, “It is therefore not the specific predictability of the modeling and subsequent 
simulation that provide policy analytics and planning value, but rather the enhanced 
understanding of nonlinearities within the system and the ability for decision-makers to 
easily evaluate changes in system variables and structure.”46 
                                                 
45 Sterman. Business Dynamics 12.  
46 Wayne Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics Modelling in Policy Analytics and Planning,” In: 
Policy, Analystics, Modeling, and Informatics, ed. Gil-Garcia J., Pardo T., Luna-Reyes L. (Switzerland: 
Springer International Publishing, 2018), 125. 
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Our thesis research and model strive to illustrate some of the critical variables and 
feedback mechanisms within the problematic system we are analyzing, and we 
acknowledge the limitations of the System Dynamics in terms of prescribing predictive 
solutions for complex policy problems. In “How Small System Dynamics Models Can 
Help the Public Policy Process,” its authors address the limitations and opportunities of 
employing System Dynamics in the realm of policy and strategy. While acknowledging 
that System Dynamics may not always be the best method for assessing policy, the authors 
do emphasize that “Small models help policymakers learn about the environment and the 
sources of policy resistance, build learning environments for experimentation, overcome 
overconfidence, and develop a shared understanding among stakeholders.”47 
B. CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM 
We not only assumed that Security and Prosperity are two domains that India and 
Pakistan (and all state actors) aspire to achieve, but we also acknowledged that there would 
be some level of feedback between the two domains as they exist in the international 
system. Figure 3 is a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) that represents the most basic conceptual 
framework of our System. 
 
Figure 3. Prosperity and Security CLD 
Our objective of modeling is to identify feedback mechanisms within the system 
structure that affect the inflow and outflow of the stocks. As a preliminary step, we 
                                                 
47 Navid Ghaffarzadegan, John Lyneis, and George P. Richardson. “How Small System Dynamics 
Models Can Help the Public Policy Process.” System Dynamics Review 27, no. 1 (2011), 41. 
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expanded our simple CLD to reflect constituent components or clusters. Figure 4 is the 
CLD that expands our simple, macro CLD into three primary subsystems or loops. 
 
Figure 4. Three Loop CLD 
The three primary loops in Figure 4 demonstrate that there are multiple flows of 
feedback throughout our system model, where some interactions serve to reinforce system 
behaviors (such as the overall interactions in the “Security & Rivalry Loop” in Figure 4), 
and others serve to balance the system’s behavior (such as the “Prosperity Loops” for both 
Pakistan and India). The simplified CLD provides more intuitive analysis because the high-
level variables (converters) allow us to make qualitative assumptions about the polarities 
(+ or -) assigned to the complex interactions of our model. Tables 1 and 2 explain our logic 
that defines the behavior of the interaction. 
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C. POLARITY LOGIC 
Table 1. Pakistan and India Prosperity Loop 
Starting 
Converter 
Ending Converter Polarity (+ or -) Justification 
 







As metrics of national 
fragility increase, we 
assume economic 








Sub variables include 
economic and social 
factors such as GDP, 
population. Growth 
assumes more capital 








A more capable 
defense force will 
decrease the fragility 
of a nation’s security.  






The more fragile a 
nation is domestically, 








The increased external 
intervention will 
increase the fragility 





Table 2. Security and Rivalry Loop (Reinforcing) 
Starting 
Converter 
Ending Converter Polarity (+ or -) Justification 
 




of Security Cluster 
Negative (-) 
Balancing 
A more capable 
defense force will 
decrease the fragility 
of a nation’s security.  
Pakistan Fragility 





As Pakistan’s security 
becomes more fragile, 
India will not divest 








A more capable 
defense force will 
decrease the fragility 
of a nation’s security.  






As India’s security 
becomes more fragile, 
Pakistan will not 
divest from its defense 
capabilities. 
 
At a macro level, the great power competition between China and the U.S. 
manifests itself globally, where actions taken by a great power employing their instruments 
of national power (Militarily, Economically, Diplomatically, Informationally) can elicit a 
reaction from a competitor great power on an entirely separate continent. We assume that 
the more intense great power competition becomes, geographic boundaries cannot confine 
cycles of actions and responses between competitors. Our Baseline Model is absent of 
external influence from the great powers (U.S. and China) and seeks to represent the 
dichotomy between India and Pakistan with minimal external influence on the system. In 
the Adjusted Model, however, we seek to display some of the potential effects that U.S. 
intervention can bring upon the system. U.S. Intervention is represented in our model by 
influencing the fragility scores of India and is ultimately assessed by seeing how these 
effects influence the parity between India and Pakistan in terms of prosperity and security.  
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D. STOCKS AND FLOWS 
After a CLD provides the conceptual cause and effect framework of a system, 
“Stock” and “Flow” System Dynamics models allow users to evaluate and measure 
potential behavioral outcomes of a bounded system that has both quantitative and 
qualitative data and assumptions. “Stocks” are accumulations that represent the state of the 
system at a given point in time. “Flows” represent the net rate at which Stocks increase or 
decrease. Figure 5 is a simplified diagram of standard Stock and Flow symbols, where 
Stocks represent some accumulation, and Flows indicate some rate. 
 
Figure 5. Stock and Flow Diagram.48 
E. SYSTEM BOUNDARIES 
In order to identify the feedback mechanisms and nonlinearities of a complex 
system that is generating problematic behavior, it is necessary to establish the boundaries 
                                                 
48 Source: Sterman, Business Dynamics, 193. 
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of the system. How does one know where one system stops, and another begins? Which 
structural elements are exogenous to the system and which are endogenous? System 
dynamics is used to model an endogenous system, although exogenous variables can be 
used for input. System boundaries are arbitrarily defined, so it is important to make the 
system boundaries neither too large nor too small to be effective as a model. 
While defining the boundaries of a problematic system is an arbitrary and artificial 
decision, it is necessary. When explaining how indispensable boundaries are for analyzing 
system behavior, Donella Meadows explains how establishing system boundaries is often 
the most difficult concept for systems practitioners, and fixating on the perfect boundary 
should not necessarily be the objective of modeling.49 Therefore, establishing boundaries 
of a system falls into a spectrum, where one does not want to draw boundaries so narrowly 
that critical structural elements are omitted, nor does one want to bound a system so broadly 
that the system’s complexity is overwhelming and the critical feedback mechanisms are 
lost in the details. 
F. MODEL ANALYSIS 
1. Baseline Model 
Figure 6 is a macro view of our overall system using the Stella Architect software 
program. The appendices of this thesis explain the structuring of data, converters, 
regression analysis applied to data inputs of our model. The symmetry of this model shows 
the dichotomy of India and Pakistan. 
                                                 
49 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, 97. 
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Figure 6. Macro Model in Stella 
a. Interactions between Pakistan and India 
Our model abbreviation for India has the indicator of “IND,” and for Pakistan is 
designated as “PAK.” Figure 7 shows the simplified version of the overall interaction 
between PAK Prosperity and IND Prosperity stocks. The two perceived prosperity 
converters pull data from the PAK and IND Prosperity stocks in order to graph the 
interaction. The prosperity parity converter represents the value of the PAK Perceived 
Prosperity converter minus the value of the IND Perceived Prosperity. The security parity 
converter follows the same format as outlined in Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. Prosperity Parity 
 
 
Figure 8. Security Parity 
b. Prosperity and Security Overview 
As our model runs in the Stella program, the converters produce outputs for the 
perceived difference in security and prosperity found in Figure 9. The behavior of Pakistan 
Prosperity and Security is in green in Figure 9, India’s behavior is in blue, and the 
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difference between the two behaviors are plotted in red, labeled as “Parity.” The x-axis 
represents time in years, and the y-axis represents the overall value calculated from the 
interaction of the converters into the prosperity and security stocks over time.  
 
Figure 9. Baseline Graph 
The trend for Pakistan, in green, Prosperity and Security is that their values have a 
slightly negative slope, which indicates that the overall fragility of their country is decreasing. 
The trend for India, in blue, Prosperity and Security are that their values have a positive slope, 
which indicates the over the fragility of the country is increasing gradually over time. 
Figure 10 plots the difference between India and Pakistan’s prosperity and security year 
to year. For example, in Figure 9 the value of Pakistan’s Prosperity in 2010 equaled 60.1, and 
Pakistan’s Security equaled 53.9, India’s Prosperity equaled 53.1, and India’s Security 
equaled 44.3. Our analysis for the year 2010 is that Pakistan is more fragile when compared 
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to India in both Prosperity and Security. We continued with historical data and forecasted data 
to project the analysis from 2006 to 2028.  
 
Figure 10. Parity Index 
We title this analysis as the Parity Index (PI). Figure 10 represents the behavior of the 
system with parity between the levels of Prosperity and Security between Pakistan and India. 
We interpret this graph as using values that represent the byproduct of Prosperity and Security 
differences between Pakistan and India, where the operating equation is Pakistan Prosperity 
and Security minus India Prosperity and Security. Therefore, a higher value on this chart 
indicates a more significant difference in parity between the two countries. 
Based on our regression analysis, the values in 2028 indicate that India remains less 
fragile compared to Pakistan but at a steadily decreasing rate over time. Therefore, the slope 
on this graph is critical because it indicates the direction of relative fragility. For example, 
when the prosperity and security lines cross zero on this graph, it will indicate that both 
countries are equal to each other, and have reached levels of parity in terms of fragility. The 
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further the gap with positive values indicates that India is less fragile than Pakistan. 
Conversely, the further the gap with negative values indicates that Pakistan is less fragile. 
This baseline graph in Figure 9 becomes extremely helpful for our policy analysis 
because it illustrates a trend of behavior over time between India and Pakistan, where its 
values and slope can be a determining factor for whether or not policy implementations are 
successful. For example, if the partnership with China enhances Pakistan’s geopolitical 
powers relative to India’s, then the U.S. may consider interventions that delay or disrupt 
Pakistan’s direction towards parity with India by providing India with support to counter the 
support that China is providing to Pakistan. Our Adjusted Model then allows us to experiment 
with identifying which areas can be influenced by the U.S. in its quest to enhance India’s 
prosperity and security. The effects of changes to our model would be evident by changes in 
this slope or projected value over time. We will use this Parity Index as a baseline model to 
create adjustments that suggest possible solutions for supporting India as a regional ally. 
2. Adjusted Model 
The purpose of the Adjusted Model is to provide a proof of concept that small 
adjustments to the model can impact the overall system. Since our Adjusted Model has 
numerous converters and data sets, combinations will alter the system’s behavior over time. 
To simplify this exercise in our model, we chose to incrementally manipulate five variables 
for India, with the objective being to simulate what could happen if India were able to reduce 
their fragility in certain areas and to make adjustments to their defense spending (ref Appendix 
A). 
The results section of this thesis compares the difference between our Baseline Model 
compared to our Adjusted Model. We attempted to integrate a reasonable change to the 
variables that could influence the future outcome of India’s prosperity and security (ref 
Appendix A). We did not change any values in the Pakistan model, and the values remain the 
same on the graph. The overall interpretation of this graph, according to the selection of 
variables and their interaction, is that there is a trend of decreasing fragility over time, meaning 
that Pakistan is improving. Figure 9 displays the adjusted values represented in Appendix B. 
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Figure 11. Adjusted Model 
The overall interpretation of the Baseline Model is that Pakistan is becoming less 
fragile, and India is becoming more fragile over time. However, with the input of the adjusted 
values, there are noticeable changes in the Adjusted Model. Figure 11 represents behavioral 
outcomes that resulted from modifications of data (ref Appendix A). The values for India 
Security appear to level out, and the values for India Prosperity appear to have a slightly 
negative slope, which indicates improvement. 
To tie this all back to our research question concerning the effects of great power 
competition in South Asia, the system model we created is a theoretical construct of some of 
the forces that shape regional geopolitics. On a macroeconomic level, we assess Pakistan’s 
growing relationship with China is increasing Pakistan’s levels of prosperity and security. 
According to our model’s outputs in terms of fragility, these increases to Pakistan’s security 
and prosperity relative to India’s puts the two countries on a path towards parity. India 
recognizes the change in this behavior may infringe on their long-term interests and could 
discourage them from cooperating with their immediate competitors of Pakistan and China 




In this final chapter, we complement the quantitative outputs of our system model 
with some qualitative suggestions for U.S. policy, specifically by highlighting key areas 
where the U.S. may be able to enhance India’s future prosperity and security. In an era of 
great power competition, the U.S.-India alliance presents a variety of opportunities to 
advance mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific region. India has long been considered a 
foreign policy challenge for the U.S., due mostly to its traditional commitment to 
nonalignment and strategic autonomy, and its desire for a multi-polar international system. 
India’s foreign policies represent constraints for the U.S.-India alliance. However, our 
system model demonstrates how the China-Pakistan alliance is influencing regional 
prosperity and security, making India’s future policy decisions ever more critical. Tellis 
emphasized the significance and urgency for India to overcome its policy hesitations to 
change policies, by saying, “India’s claims to exceptionalism will not suffice to either 
protect its security or to increase its influence, its missteps within will have an outsized 
impact abroad.” 50  Overall, we argue that the opportunities in the U.S.-India alliance 
outweigh its challenges, and we acknowledge that regardless of the engagement approach, 
the U.S. will have to display patience and resolve in deepening the long-term strategic 
partnership with India. 
A. VALUE OF SYSTEM OF DYNAMICS 
Our research question states, how can we use system dynamics modeling enhance 
our understanding of the parity of prosperity and security between Pakistan and India in 
the context of great power competition? To answer our research question, we built a model 
that features the nations of India and Pakistan as the primary actors in our system, and we 
chose state fragility to be the premiere metric for changes of the system outputs. Our 
                                                 
50 Ashley J. Tellis. Troubles Aplenty: Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next Indian Government 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace) 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/
2019/05/20/troubles-aplenty-foreign-policy-challenges-for-next-indian-government-pub-79161. 
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research illustrates that system dynamics models can indeed make substantial contributions 
to the development of policy and strategy in the era of great power competition.  
In Chapter II, we described Kennedy’s observation that national economic power 
and military strength are constantly evolving relative to another nation’s within their 
competitive system, highlighting how changes in relative power are a constant condition 
for the international system.51 This concept is precisely supported by system dynamics 
modeling because one of the unique attributes of systems models is that it identifies the 
various feedback loops and nonlinear interactions, which can be leveraged to highlight 
power transitions amongst actors within a system. Our model successfully supported 
Kennedy’s theoretical connections between economic and military prowess because it 
models the critical feedback relationships between a nation’s prosperity & security, as well 
as feedback relationships between a nation’s performances in these areas relative to a rival. 
Either of these feedback loops considered by themselves would not allow for as much 
experimentation on potential outcomes in response to input changes, but our system 
dynamics model’s connectivity between the concepts of security and prosperity allowed us 
to see changes in India’s fragility relative to that of its rival Pakistan.  
Our research demonstrated a few other ways of how system dynamics models can 
also serve as a platform for enhancing the existing works of Power Transition Theory and 
Hegemonic Stability Theory. A hegemon that fails to establish the necessary alliances to 
preserve its supremacy will result in a challenger that has a more likely chance of 
surpassing the incumbent power within the system. Our systems model, and others like it, 
can provide a means for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of such coalitions, 
identifying whether or not such partnerships are viable, or pinpointing areas that best 
represent opportunities are for mutual growth. The value added by system dynamics 
modeling in this regard makes them particularly useful in the era of great power 
competition, as the U.S. seeks to deepen its ties with strategic partners, such as India. 
We reference earlier in Chapter II how Snidal and Keohane identify that an 
international system’s hegemony is in a unique position to reward cooperation amongst 
                                                 
51 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 536. 
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member nations and to punish revisionism among the system’s non-cooperators. Our 
research has shown that system dynamics models can provide a means for testing and 
observing such shaping actions initiated by the hegemon. In specific reference to our 
model, the hegemon of our system in the U.S. and India cooperative provides an 
opportunity to assess these theories because manipulating values in some regions of the 
model can produce more exaggerated changes to behavior when compared to other areas. 
Also, in Chapter II, we described how Snyder’s Alliance Politics differentiates 
between two trajectories that alliances can take, each destined for mutually exclusive end-
states, where one may trend towards a strengthening relationship, and the other displays 
the qualities of diminishing ties.52 Systems models feature similar categories of behavior, 
where feedbacks either have reinforcing (positive) or balancing (negative) relationships. 
Therefore, systems models provide value because any behavioral changes exhibited by the 
system can then reveal which areas may provide the most leverage to the incumbent 
hegemon (or perhaps an aspiring challenger), or identify trend lines that could have 
repercussions in the future such as nations reaching parity with one another, growing closer 
together with opportunities of mutual prosperity, or growing closer together via collective 
security cooperation. 
Overall, our research and model suggest that system modeling is an appropriate tool 
for assessing coalitions in the era of great power competition because they take into account 
the various reinforcing and balancing behaviors throughout an entire system. The outputs 
of a systems model can then provide a means for distilling these complexities down into a 
more observable behavior of a system, ultimately producing policy or strategy 
recommendations that can generate favorable outcomes. 
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR A U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO 
ENHANCING INDIA’S PROSPERITY 
U.S. engagement to enhance India’s Prosperity is considered by most to be less 
provocative than direct security intervention in countering China’s regional influence. A 
                                                 
52 Snyder, Alliance politics, 339. 
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U.S. economic alliance with its key Indo-Pacific ally is no different than what China is 
pursuing with its BRI investments and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Most 
importantly, the lines of effort in this U.S. strategic approach could play a crucial role in 
helping India overcome many of its domestic challenges as an emerging power. As India 
becomes the world’s most populous country and the world’s second-largest economy by 
2050,53 it will have to address challenges such as integrating rural populations into the 
economy, dealing with the effects of climate change, and the constant threat of domestic 
terrorism and insurgency. 
Additionally, India’s energy demands are projected to surge, which may require 
them to implement new foreign policies in support of their energy security, similar to 
China’s deliberate strategies to satisfy their growing energy needs.54 For the U.S., these 
challenges represent opportunities to demonstrate a stronger commitment to India as a 
strategic ally. In line with the NSS’s recognition of India becoming a more prominent 
power in the region, the U.S. will need to support its allies to ensure India’s domestic well-
being and continued growth. The following are four areas where the U.S. could focus its 
engagement to enhance India’s prosperity: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Facilitate 
India’s energy demands; Strengthen vocational and technical education; and, Improve 
India’s health care system.  
Foreign Direct Investment from the U.S. will allow India’s economy to sustain its 
growth projection and to better cope with domestic challenges. India’s retail, e-commerce, 
and information technology services are sectors in which FDI can catalyze India’s 
economy with positive secondary effects on Indian prosperity and regional cooperation. 
Furthermore, FDI can facilitate the development of rural population infrastructure as well 
as specific projects to enhance India’s economic attractiveness for regional neighbors, such 
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as was done in the Iranian commercial port of Chabahar and the North-south corridor 
through Afghanistan. 
As a net exporter of oil and gas, the U.S. could provide a source to help meet India’s 
energy requirements. Not only could this partnership insulate India from some of the 
market shocks on oil and gas prices, but the liquefied natural gas provided by the U.S. 
offers a much cleaner alternative to fossil fuels that have been devastating numerous urban 
populations in India via unaddressed pollution. Investments in renewable energy 
technologies would also be helpful. Moreover, the United States could act as a facilitator 
to enhance the energy relations between India and the Gulf States, diminishing India’s 
reliance on Iran and Russia. 
Unlike China’s rising economy with its industrial foundation, India’s economy has 
a much more robust services sector.55 The U.S. private sector has enormous potential to 
strengthen the ties between the two economies, and the promotion of micro-economies 
supported by local specific vocational and technical education can increase India’s 
manufacturing capability and generate jobs. Pursuing enhanced educational and academic 
exchanges would also be of mutual benefit for India and the U.S. in areas of advanced 
technology while helping to reduce the economic gap between rural and urban areas in 
India. 
Lastly, the health care systems in India will need improvement as the population 
continues to grow, which presents an opportunity for the U.S. to contribute resources and 
investment in infrastructure. These investments could increase access to quality health care 
and thereby close the gap between private and public health care systems. Related to these 
health care infrastructure improvements would be reliable waste management, sanitation, 
and clean water systems. 
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C. RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO 
ENHANCING INDIA’S SECURITY 
From a regional security perspective, the U.S. and India have much in common: 
both seek stability in Afghanistan, both seek to quell terrorism and extremism, both 
encourage FOIP as a policy framework for preserving prosperity and security in the Indo-
Pacific, and finally, both are concerned about China’s military presence and influence 
throughout the region.56 As a result of these common interests, our third strategic approach 
aims to minimize risk within the security domain. There are three primary areas of 
opportunities for enhanced U.S. assistance and cooperative engagement in the security 
domain: India’s internal security of organic military capabilities; India’s defense against 
external threats via security agreements and interstate alliances; and, assistance to India 
through Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) efforts. 
India’s existing military capabilities face significant challenges. For instance, 
India’s armed forces are under-resourced and are lacking in long-term acquisition 
mechanisms or programs. India’s security apparatus must balance contending with 
domestic terrorism, providing security over a substantial area of border regions, quelling 
uprisings in Kashmir, and maintaining the readiness of conventional forces for a potential 
war with Pakistan at a moment’s notice. All taken together, India could have much to gain 
from internal balancing vis-à-vis U.S. assistance. For example, military sales between the 
U.S. and India have increased substantially over the last decade.57 Upgraded weapons 
systems delivered by the U.S., particularly Naval assets, would bolster India’s defense 
capabilities, hedge against their concerns over Chinese militarization in the Indian Ocean 
or Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and would allow their leadership to maintain their long-held 
foreign policy of “Non-alignment.”58 
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Additionally, if India successfully addresses regional security threats without 
substantial assistance from a foreign power, it will be more likely to gain recognition from 
its neighbors as being a regional hegemon that can perform a legitimate security role in 
South Asia, which offsets the military partnership of Pakistan and China in the region. 
Furthermore, India would be able to accomplish this without completely 
outsourcing its security dependencies to the U.S. Joint exercises will allow India to 
continually improve its ability to defend its interests while also identifying and prioritizing 
critical gaps within its security apparatus. Looking beyond the exchange of weapons and 
technology, India also needs to consider the military capabilities of both Pakistan and 
China as it calculates security requirements.59 A challenge for India is that its conventional 
advantages over Pakistan are offset by the threat of nuclear attacks, and the current 
disparity between its military capabilities with China puts them at a substantial 
disadvantage. This crucial gap in capabilities, when compared to China, leads to another 
option for India—which is to pursue further security assurance form the U.S. and other 
regional allies. 
The Quad security alliance is a delicate concept because its members do not wish 
to present themselves as too overtly threatening to China in the Indo-Pacific. However, 
despite these challenges, Quad member nations want to message that the idea of the Quad 
can quickly become a reality in defense of shared values, primarily the values identified in 
the FOIP. If the U.S. were to steer the Quad towards an operational security alliance, U.S. 
presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as in Australian and Japanese, would provide a 
strategic boost for India in several ways. First, such a security alliance would function as 
deterrence against Chinese expansion or aggression that India would not otherwise be able 
to achieve unilaterally, or even by hasty bilateral agreements. Second, the Naval presence 
provided by the Quad members would allow India to redirect resources into other priority 
areas such as economic development. A Quad security alliance would allow India to 
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Future Directions International, last modified February 26, 2019, http://www.futuredirections.org.au/
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balance better and prioritize its defense spending for border security, counterterrorism, and 
contingencies with Kashmir, Pakistan, and even contested border regions with China. 
Moreover, Quad members committing Naval forces in the Indian ocean would 
allow India to gain more time to obtain the necessary upgrades to its Naval force structure. 
Such improvements would allow India to develop into a more capable ally that can project 
power throughout the region. Further, such power would enable India to assist Japan with 
unforeseen contingencies in the Pacific, far away from its comfort zone in the Indian 
Ocean.60 
In conclusion, throughout this research process, we sought to answer the research 
question: Can system dynamics modeling enhance our understanding of the parity of 
prosperity and security between Pakistan and India in the context of great power 
competition? Our modeling has helped us quantify and analyze the perception of prosperity 
and security parity as measured by the Fragile States index, and to assess the potential 
impact of proposed policy changes to ensure India maintains an advantage over Pakistan 
or, at least, maintains parity. In an era of great power competition, local or regional policy 
decisions can have unanticipated global strategic consequences over time. System 
dynamics modeling can be used to help enhance our understanding of non-linear 
interactions within a defined system and to measure the potential effects of implementing 
policy changes over an extended time horizon. 
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APPENDIX A. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING 
A. CONVERTERS 
The five primary converters that comprise the In-Flow for both the India and 
Pakistan Prosperity and Security stocks are 1) FSI Prosperity Converter, 2) Growth 
Converter, 3) 𝑋𝑋1 - External Intervention, 4) FSI Security Converter, and 5) Defense 
Converter. Our model uses the data outputs from these converters to generate the overall 
values for each county’s Security and Prosperity stock. The following paragraphs will 
further explain the converters and the regression analysis. Of note, the following 
paragraphs showcase our system’s methodology for Pakistan only, while the same process 
is replicated for India’s values in our model.  
1. FSI Prosperity Converter 
For prosperity, the first input comes directly from the FSI variables. These variables 
are added together to give us our first prosperity input. PAK FSI Prosperity Converter 
consists of the following eight variables: 𝐶𝐶2—Factional Elites, 𝐶𝐶3 -Group Grievances, 
𝐸𝐸1Economic Decline,  𝐸𝐸2 -Economic Decline, 𝐸𝐸3 -Brain Drain, 𝑃𝑃2 -Public Services,  𝑆𝑆1 -
Demographic Pressure, and 𝑆𝑆2-Refugees/IDPs. As a reminder, the FSI variables are each 
on a scale of 0 to 10. Because there are eight variables used for the prosperity input, the 
range of data could be 0 to 80. Figure 12 displays the FSI prosperity inputs that feed into 
the Pakistan FSI prosperity converter as it appears in the Stella software. Table 3 conveys 
the data inputs for each converter, where the values in black represent historical data (2006-
2018), and the values in red are forecasted based off of our linear regression (2019-2028). 
Finally, the equation in Figure 12 illustrates how the various converters are summed 
together to create overall value for the FSI Prosperity converter. 
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Table 3. FSI Prosperity Variables Forecasted Data 
 
 
Figure 12 represents all of the FSI variables that feed into the FSI prosperity 
converter. Table 3 represents the data we collected from the FSI up to 2018. The values in 
red use trend line forecasting to estimate future values.  
 
Figure 12. FSI Prosperity Converter 
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This is the equation used for the FSI Prosperity Converter: 
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶3 + 𝐸𝐸1 + 𝐸𝐸2 + 𝐸𝐸3 + 𝑃𝑃1 + 𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑆𝑆2 
2. Growth Converter 
The second input comes from a multivariate regression of five open-source data 
variables: Polity, GDP, Imports, Growth %, Population. Table 4 displays the growth 
variables that feed into the growth converter, where forecasted data from linear regression 
is again in red. Figure 13 represent the integration of the growth converter variables in the 
model. 




Figure 13. Growth Converter 
Figure 14 is the multivariate regression output that we entered into our systems 
model to explain the behavior in the growth converter. Each of these variables is 
statistically significant, with all p-values significantly lower than .001. This model is also 
moderately strong, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.3827. 
 
Figure 14. Growth Converter Regression Output 
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This is the equation used for the growth converter. 
𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 51.85 − .7153 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 + .0265 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − .00000000005803 ∗ 
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + .01694 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃ℎ % 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 + .000000000007382 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 
3. External Intervention 
𝑋𝑋1- External Intervention is a unique variable of the FSI data set because it attempts 
to capture a representative metric for all outside influence on the behavior of a country, 
spanning a wide variety of interactions between a state and its surrounding system.61 To 
contextualize External Intervention, Figure 15 is the scaled value chart that categorizes and 
provides key characteristics of the FSI value of external intervention.  
 
Figure 15. External Intervention Scaled Values62 
                                                 
61 Fragile States Index Methodology and CAST Framework, 6. 
62 Source: Conflict Assessment Framework Manual,16. 
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Table 5. External Intervention Forecasted Data 
 
 
Table 5 depicts the values for X1 that were inputs for our model. Again, values in 
black represent historical data (2006-2018), and values in red indicate a forecasted value 
based off of regression (2019-2028). 
Within our systems model, the 𝑋𝑋1- External Intervention variable contributes to the 
inflow of both the prosperity and security stocks for India and Pakistan. Using linear 
regression, X1 can be used to predict prosperity levels as indicated in Figure 16. PAK X1 
is statistically significant in predicting prosperity while using this model because the p-
value associated with X1 is well below .001. The model itself is very strong, with an 
adjusted R-squared value of 0.7648. 
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Figure 16. External Intervention Regression Output 
The regression equation for the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑋𝑋1- External Intervention converter is: 
𝑋𝑋1𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 14.26280 + 5.74299 ∗ 𝑋𝑋1 
4. FSI Security Converter 
The fourth converter that adds to the security inflow is the security converter. 
Because of the lack of transparency of the FSI data set, we opted to input observed control 
variables that contribute to the overall system. For example, the PAK FSI Security 
Converter consists of the following seven variables: 𝐶𝐶1-Security Apparatus, 𝐶𝐶2–Factional 
Elites, 𝐶𝐶3 -Group Grievances,  𝑃𝑃1 -State Legitimacy, 𝑆𝑆1 -Demographic Pressure, and 𝑆𝑆2 -
Refugees/IDPs. As a reminder, the FSI variables are each on a scale of 0 to 10. Figure 17 
displays the security FSI inputs that feed into the Pakistan FSI security converter and Table 
6 displays the values of the system inputs. 
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Figure 17. FSI Security Converter 
Table 6. FSI Security Converter Forecasted Data 
 
5. Defense Converter 
The next converter that contributes to the security inflow is the defense converter. 
There are four variables that feed into the PAK Defense Converter, which are: PAK 
Defense Spending, Defense Spending as a % of GDP, population, and polity (represented 
by Dem in the regression equation, where the polity score ranges from -10 to 10, where -
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10 is an autocracy, and 10 is a democracy.). Figure 18 displays the defense variables that 
feed into the Pakistan defense converter and Table 7 of values for the system inputs. 
 
Figure 18. Defense Converter 




Our multivariate regression equation for the security is: 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 4.99 − 1.22 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 + .01122 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + .4775 ∗
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 % 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 + .00000000001 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅  
B. STOCKS 
1. Prosperity 
With all of the converters explained and defined, the next step is to explain the 
interaction of the converters that feed into the inflows and outflows of the stocks. Figure 
19 focuses on the inputs and outputs of the Pakistan Prosperity stock (the model structure 
of converters, flows, and stocks are the same for both India and Pakistan). Three converters 
- PAK FSI Prosperity, PAK Growth, and PAX X1 - all feed into the PAK Prosperity In-
Flow. The PAK Security stock will be explained similarly to the PAK Prosperity stock, but 
it is important to note that it is integrated into the PAK Prosperity as one of its In-Flows, 
intending to model the feedback relationship between a nation’s Security and Prosperity. 
In the Stella modeling software, a dashed figure represents a “ghosted” symbol, one 
that simply duplicates an existing model element to avoid clutter from crossed connectors. 
For example, the PAK prosperity In-Flow is ghosted into PAK Prosperity Out-Flow 
because the equation in the PAK Prosperity Out-Flow clears the stock at every interval 
(each year in this case). Clearing this stock every year prevents the stock from artificially 
accumulating its value over time. Lastly, the converter labeled PAK Perceived Prosperity 




Figure 19. Prosperity Stock 
2. Security 
Figure 20 focuses on the inputs and outputs of the Pakistan Security stock. The 
figure illustrates how PAK Security In-flow is provided inputs by five converters and one 
stock. The PAK Prosperity stock is integrated into the PAK security In-Flow to show 
feedback within the system, and it is given equal weight to other inputs from the system, 
suggesting that this relationship of system interaction is just as meaningful as other factors 
determining Security values. The next section will explain the output of the perceived 
differences, which will title the Parity Index. 
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Figure 20. Security Stock 
3. Model Equations 













𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =  
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃ℎ + 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆 + 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝑋𝑋1
4
+ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =  




𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
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The primary goal of this model is to understand the interaction between prosperity 
and security. Evaluating the perceived difference between India and Pakistan, prosperity, 
and security allows us to model the effects of potential U.S. policy changes to support U.S. 
objectives in the region. The next section explains our data forecasting methodology and 
integrating this data into the model. 
4. Data Forecasting 
We conducted a regression analysis to forecast future prosperity and security based 
on historic data from 2006–2017. We used the statistical analysis program, R, and 
Microsoft Excel to compute trend lines. In order to forecast the future values of India and 
Pakistan variables specifically, we used trend line forecasting, based on 2006–2015 
historical data. Finally, individual variables for each country were later put back into the 
international regressions for prosperity and security equations to generate forecasted 
values. 
Figures 21 and 22 are two sample variables we used in developing the trend lines. 
We selected a control variable and an FSI variable to illustrate our methodology. For IND 
GDP, found in Figure 21, it is clear there is a strong correlation of the trend line to the data.  
 
Figure 21. Sample Data Forecast—India GDP 
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Figure 22. Sample Data Forecast—Pakistan External Intervention 
When we did a trend line regression of PAK XI, in Figure 22, and the level of 
accuracy diminished because of the small sample size of the data set. The overall trend 
shows that the X1 level of fragility is increasing, whereas the X1 values over the last three 
years suggests that PAK X1 fragility is decreasing. 
After attempting to use exponential smoothing and multiple averages for 
forecasting, we found trend line regression analysis was the best fit, especially for variables 
with large values like defense spending or population. The strength of correlation in such 
cases was extremely high. We conducted this type of analysis for all of the variables used 
in our regression equations. 
C. ADJUSTED MODEL 
1. Intent 
We intended to make changes to the model that could provide U.S. policymakers 
insight into the effects of past decisions and the potential behavioral outcomes of proposed 
adjustments in policy. While we understand there arbitrarily defined system boundaries, 
this model will be helpful as a point of reference when developing future courses of action. 
2. Methodology 
Since U.S. policy supports strengthening the relationship with India, we focused on 
the adjustment of certain variables in India’s prosperity and security portions of the system. 
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We only made changes to the forecasted data, while the historical data remained the same 
throughout the model adjustment. We limited the selection of variables to those the U.S. 
could most reasonably affect as a foreign ally of India because some variables are sovereign 
areas of the Indian government and inherently insulated from the influences of foreign 
powers. We selected defense spending and five FSI variables: P2 (Public Services), P3 
(Human Rights and Rule of Law), E1 (Economic Decline), C1 (Security Apparatus), and 
X1 (External Intervention). With each variable selected for adjustments, we explain the 
justification for selection, rate of change, and the general expectation of the potential 
impact on India. Lastly, we contextualize the FSI variables by providing a tangible example 
for each of them, and we discuss how some of these simple adjustments may have the 
potential to decrease India’s fragility. 
a. Defense Spending 
Under the India defense converter for India Security, the adjustment to defense 
spending was two-fold, we changed the percentage of Original GDP spent on defense 
spending to and Adjusted rate of 3%. Our regression forecast indicated an annual decline 
of about .01%. Thus, we recommend an adjustment to an annual percentage maintaining a 
3% expenditure of defense spending. This 3% was applied to our forecasted GDP values 
to get Adjusted Forecast shown in Table 8. The values in the Difference column are the 
amounts of money India would add, on an annual basis, to its defense expenditures. The 
values roughly translate to an annual increase of 1% in the defense budget for the next ten 
years. 
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Table 8. Defense Spending Adjusted Values 
 
 
b. FSI Variables 
Of the 12 FSI variables, we selected five variables that best represent where the 
U.S. could leverage elements of national power (such as diplomacy, military aid, or 
economic assistance) in a way that could bolster India’s regional influence. We selected 
P2 (Public Services), P3 (Human Rights and Rule of Law), E1 (Economic Decline), C1 
(Security Apparatus), and X1 (External Intervention). The values in the original column 
represent the trend line forecasting used in Chapter IV. The values in the adjusted column 
represent a 1% decrease in value from the previous year. Because these values are 
representative of changes to the system, we used a gradual approach to reach a value that 
the country of India has reached before. Thus, this is a reasonable attempt to modify the 
system to reach an FSI value that is attainable. Table 9 displays the values we used for 
trend line forecasting and adjusted values used for India. 
Year INDIA GDP Original Adjusted Original Forecast Adjusted Forecast Difference
2018 $2,200,000,000,000 2.49% 3% $54,744,800,000 $66,000,000,000 $11,255,200,000
2019 $2,300,000,000,000 2.48% 3% $57,019,300,000 $69,000,000,000 $11,980,700,000
2020 $2,400,000,000,000 2.47% 3% $59,275,200,000 $72,000,000,000 $12,724,800,000
2021 $2,500,000,000,000 2.46% 3% $61,512,500,000 $75,000,000,000 $13,487,500,000
2022 $2,600,000,000,000 2.45% 3% $63,731,200,000 $78,000,000,000 $14,268,800,000
2023 $2,700,000,000,000 2.44% 3% $65,931,300,000 $81,000,000,000 $15,068,700,000
2024 $2,800,000,000,000 2.43% 3% $68,112,800,000 $84,000,000,000 $15,887,200,000
2025 $2,900,000,000,000 2.42% 3% $70,275,700,000 $87,000,000,000 $16,724,300,000
2026 $3,000,000,000,000 2.41% 3% $72,420,000,000 $90,000,000,000 $17,580,000,000
2027 $3,100,000,000,000 2.40% 3% $74,545,700,000 $93,000,000,000 $18,454,300,000
2028 $3,200,000,000,000 2.39% 3% $76,652,800,000 $96,000,000,000 $19,347,200,000
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Table 9. FSI Variable Adjusted Values 
 
  
Year Original Adjusted Original Adjusted Original Adjusted Original Adjusted Original Adjusted
2018 7.1 7.1 5.8 5.8 5 5 7.1 7.1 5.2 5.2
2019 7.4424 7.029 6.0343 5.742 5.4961 4.95 8.3922 7.029 5.6417 5.148
2020 7.4979 6.95871 6.0612 5.68458 5.5417 4.9005 8.5823 6.95871 5.7466 5.09652
2021 7.5534 6.889123 6.0881 5.627734 5.5873 4.851495 8.7724 6.889123 5.8515 5.045555
2022 7.6089 6.820232 6.115 5.571457 5.6329 4.80298 8.9625 6.820232 5.9564 4.995099
2023 7.6644 6.752029 6.1419 5.515742 5.6785 4.75495 9.1526 6.752029 6.0613 4.945148
2024 7.7199 6.684509 6.1688 5.460585 5.7241 4.707401 9.3427 6.684509 6.1662 4.895697
2025 7.7754 6.617664 6.1957 5.405979 5.7697 4.660327 9.5328 6.617664 6.2711 4.84674
2026 7.8309 6.551487 6.2226 5.351919 5.8153 4.613723 9.7229 6.551487 6.376 4.798272
2027 7.8864 6.485972 6.2495 5.2984 5.8609 4.567586 9.913 6.485972 6.4809 4.75029
2028 7.9419 6.421113 6.2764 5.245416 5.9065 4.52191 10 6.421113 6.5858 4.702787
P2 P3 E1 C1 X1
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APPENDIX B. STELLA MODELING EQUATIONS 
A. STOCKS AND FLOWS 
1. India Prosperity 
India_Prosperity(t) = India_Prosperity(t - dt) + (“IND_Prosperity_In-Flow” - 
“IND_Prosperity_Out-flow”) * dt 
  INIT India_Prosperity = 0 
  UNITS: Prosperity 
INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: Prosperity/Years 
OUTFLOWS: 
      “IND_Prosperity_Out-flow” = DELAY(“IND_Prosperity_In-Flow,” 1, 0) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: Prosperity/Years 
India Security 
India_Security(t) = India_Security(t - dt) + (“IND_Security_In-Flow” - 
“IND_Security_Out-flow”) * dt 
  INIT India_Security = 0 
  UNITS: Security 
  INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: Security/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      “IND_Security_Out-flow” = DELAY(“IND_Security_In-Flow,” 1, 0) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: Security/Years 
Pakistan Prosperity 
Pakistan_Prosperity(t) = Pakistan_Prosperity(t - dt) + (“PAK_Prosperity_In-Flow” - 
“PAK_Prosperity_Out-flow”) * dt 
  INIT Pakistan_Prosperity = 0 
  UNITS: Prosperity 
  INFLOWS: 





          UNITS: Prosperity/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      “PAK_Prosperity_Out-flow” = DELAY(“PAK_Prosperity_In-Flow,” 1, 0) 
{UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: Prosperity/Years 
Pakistan Security 
Pakistan_Security(t) = Pakistan_Security(t - dt) + (“PAK_Security_In-Flow” - 
“PAK_Security_Out-Flow”) * dt 
  INIT Pakistan_Security = 0 
  UNITS: Security 
  INFLOWS: 




          UNITS: Security/Years 
  OUTFLOWS: 
      “PAK_Security_Out-Flow” = DELAY(“PAK_Security_In-Flow,” 1, 0) {UNIFLOW} 
          UNITS: Security/Years 















IND_Gowth = 51.85 + (IND_Polity*-.7153)+(IND_Population*.0265)+(IND_Imports*-
.00000000005803)+(IND_Growth*.1694)+(IND_GDP*.000000000007382) 
 
IND_X1:_Ex_Intervent = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 4.20), (2007.00, 4.20), (2008.00, 4.20), (2009.00, 5.10), (2010.00, 4.90), 
(2011.00, 4.50), (2012.00, 5.00), (2013.00, 5.20), (2014.00, 5.00), (2015.00, 5.30), 
(2016.00, 5.60), (2017.00, 5.40), (2018.00, 5.20), (2019.00, 5.6417), (2020.00, 5.7466), 
(2021.00, 5.8515), (2022.00, 5.9564), (2023.00, 6.0613), (2024.00, 6.1662), (2025.00, 





















PAK_X1:_Ex_Intervention = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 9.20), (2007.00, 8.00), (2008.00, 9.10), (2009.00, 9.50), (2010.00, 9.30), 
(2011.00, 9.00), (2012.00, 9.40), (2013.00, 9.60), (2014.00, 9.30), (2015.00, 9.30), 
(2016.00, 9.60), (2017.00, 9.40), (2018.00, 9.10), (2019.00, 9.5391), (2020.00, 9.5853), 
(2021.00, 9.6315), (2022.00, 9.6777), (2023.00, 9.7239), (2024.00, 9.7701), (2025.00, 
9.8163), (2026.00, 9.8625), (2027.00, 9.9087), (2028.00, 9.9549) 
 
C. SECONDARY CONVERTERS 
A_E1:_Econ_Decline_2 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 5.0), (2007.00, 4.6), (2008.00, 4.6), (2009.00, 5.0), (2010.00, 5.1), (2011.00, 
5.4), (2012.00, 5.5), (2013.00, 5.4), (2014.00, 5.7), (2015.00, 5.6), (2016.00, 5.3), 
(2017.00, 5.1), (2018.00, 5.0), (2019.00, 5.4961), (2020.00, 5.5417), (2021.00, 5.5873), 
(2022.00, 5.6329), (2023.00, 5.6785), (2024.00, 5.7241), (2025.00, 5.7697), (2026.00, 
5.8153), (2027.00, 5.8609), (2028.00, 5.9065) 
 
IND_C1:_Security_App = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 4.50), (2.00, 5.00), (3.00, 6.60), (4.00, 7.10), (5.00, 7.60), (6.00, 7.80), (7.00, 7.50), 
(8.00, 7.80), (9.00, 7.90), (10.00, 7.90), (11.00, 7.60), (12.00, 7.40), (13.00, 7.10), (14.00, 
8.3922), (15.00, 8.5823), (16.00, 8.7724), (17.00, 8.9625), (18.00, 9.1526), (19.00, 
9.3427), (20.00, 9.5328), (21.00, 9.7229), (22.00, 9.913), (23.00, 10.1031) 
 
 
IND_C2:_Fact_Elites = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 5.70), (2007.00, 5.60), (2008.00, 6.00), (2009.00, 6.00), (2010.00, 6.20), 
(2011.00, 6.80), (2012.00, 6.80), (2013.00, 6.80), (2014.00, 6.80), (2015.00, 7.30), 
(2016.00, 7.30), (2017.00, 7.30), (2018.00, 7.30), (2019.00, 7.6994), (2020.00, 7.8554), 
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(2021.00, 8.0114), (2022.00, 8.1674), (2023.00, 8.3234), (2024.00, 8.4794), (2025.00, 
8.6354), (2026.00, 8.7914), (2027.00, 8.9474), (2028.00, 9.1034) 
 
IND_C3:_Group_Grieve = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 6.9), (2007.00, 7.0), (2008.00, 7.0), (2009.00, 7.3), (2010.00, 7.8), (2011.00, 
8.2), (2012.00, 7.9), (2013.00, 8.2), (2014.00, 7.8), (2015.00, 8.3), (2016.00, 8.5), 
(2017.00, 8.3), (2018.00, 8.3), (2019.00, 8.7267), (2020.00, 8.858), (2021.00, 8.9893), 
(2022.00, 9.1206), (2023.00, 9.2519), (2024.00, 9.3832), (2025.00, 9.5145), (2026.00, 
9.6458), (2027.00, 9.7771), (2028.00, 9.9084) 
 
IND_Def_%_GDP = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 2.526809), (2007.00, 2.342634), (2008.00, 2.550195), (2009.00, 2.893496), 
(2010.00, 2.707464), (2011.00, 2.651497), (2012.00, 2.537347), (2013.00, 2.472727), 
(2014.00, 2.49677), (2015.00, 2.405127), (2016.00, 2.507), (2017.00, 2.4977), (2018.00, 
2.4884), (2019.00, 2.4791), (2020.00, 2.4698), (2021.00, 2.4605), (2022.00, 2.4512), 
(2023.00, 2.4419), (2024.00, 2.4326), (2025.00, 2.4233), (2026.00, 2.414), (2027.00, 
2.4047), (2028.00, 2.3954) 
 
IND_Defense_Spending = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 23758568105), (2007.00, 26346798071), (2008.00, 28691884998.5), (2009.00, 
29821256733.8), (2010.00, 32074765104.9), (2011.00, 36576546747.6), (2012.00, 
40610867888.3), (2013.00, 44177728526.8), (2014.00, 46447200711.2), (2015.00, 
48067978668.5), (2016.00, 57421130240), (2017.00, 66207158325), (2018.00, 
54744800000), (2019.00, 57019300000), (2020.00, 59275200000), (2021.00, 
61512500000), (2022.00, 63731200000), (2023.00, 65931300000), (2024.00, 
68112800000), (2025.00, 70275700000), (2026.00, 72420000000), (2027.00, 
74545700000), (2028.00, 76652800000) 
 
IND_E2:_Econ_Inequality = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.50), (2007.00, 8.90), (2008.00, 8.90), (2009.00, 8.90), (2010.00, 8.70), 
(2011.00, 8.50), (2012.00, 8.40), (2013.00, 8.10), (2014.00, 7.80), (2015.00, 7.50), 
(2016.00, 7.20), (2017.00, 7.00), (2018.00, 6.70), (2019.00, 6.7957), (2020.00, 6.6116), 
(2021.00, 6.4275), (2022.00, 6.2434), (2023.00, 6.0593), (2024.00, 5.8752), (2025.00, 




IND_E3:_Brain_Drain = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 7.10), (2007.00, 7.10), (2008.00, 6.90), (2009.00, 6.70), (2010.00, 6.50), 
(2011.00, 6.20), (2012.00, 5.90), (2013.00, 5.40), (2014.00, 5.20), (2015.00, 5.50), 
(2016.00, 5.80), (2017.00, 6.10), (2018.00, 6.40), (2019.00, 5.4229), (2020.00, 5.3097), 
(2021.00, 5.1965), (2022.00, 5.0833), (2023.00, 4.9701), (2024.00, 4.8569), (2025.00, 
4.7437), (2026.00, 4.6305), (2027.00, 4.5173), (2028.00, 4.4041) 
 
IND_GDP = GRAPH(TIME) 
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(2006.00, 940260000000), (2007.00, 1.22e+12), (2008.00, 1.2e+12), (2009.00, 1.34e+12), 
(2010.00, 1.68e+12), (2011.00, 1.82e+12), (2012.00, 1.83e+12), (2013.00, 1.86e+12), 
(2014.00, 2.04e+12), (2015.00, 2.1e+12), (2016.00, 2.29e+12), (2017.00, 2.65e+12), 
(2018.00, 2.2e+12), (2019.00, 2.3e+12), (2020.00, 2.4e+12), (2021.00, 2.5e+12), 
(2022.00, 2.6e+12), (2023.00, 2.7e+12), (2024.00, 2.8e+12), (2025.00, 2.9e+12), 
(2026.00, 3e+12), (2027.00, 3.1e+12), (2028.00, 3.2e+12) 
 
IND_Growth = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 9.264), (2007.00, 9.801), (2008.00, 3.891), (2009.00, 8.48), (2010.00, 10.26), 
(2011.00, 6.638), (2012.00, 5.456), (2013.00, 6.386), (2014.00, 7.41), (2015.00, 7.996), 
(2016.00, 8.17), (2017.00, 7.168), (2018.00, 7.053), (2019.00, 7.257), (2020.00, 7.489), 
(2021.00, 7.74), (2022.00, 7.731), (2023.00, 7.742), (2024.00, 7.73), (2025.00, 7.3495), 
(2026.00, 7.3283), (2027.00, 7.3071), (2028.00, 7.2859) 
 
IND_Imports = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 184000000000), (2007.00, 2.3e+11), (2008.00, 303000000000), (2009.00, 
351000000000), (2010.00, 347000000000), (2011.00, 4.5e+11), (2012.00, 
567000000000), (2013.00, 571000000000), (2014.00, 528000000000), (2015.00, 
529000000000), (2016.00, 465000000000), (2017.00, 4.8e+11), (2018.00, 
583000000000), (2019.00, 6.2e+11), (2020.00, 6.5e+11), (2021.00, 6.8e+11), (2022.00, 
7.1e+11), (2023.00, 7.4e+11), (2024.00, 7.7e+11), (2025.00, 8e+11), (2026.00, 8.3e+11), 
(2027.00, 8.6e+11), (2028.00, 8.9e+11) 
 
IND_P1:_State_Legit = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 4.80), (2007.00, 4.80), (2008.00, 4.80), (2009.00, 5.50), (2010.00, 5.80), 
(2011.00, 5.80), (2012.00, 5.50), (2013.00, 5.20), (2014.00, 5.30), (2015.00, 5.20), 
(2016.00, 4.90), (2017.00, 4.70), (2018.00, 4.40), (2019.00, 4.9381), (2020.00, 4.9106), 
(2021.00, 4.8831), (2022.00, 4.8556), (2023.00, 4.8281), (2024.00, 4.8006), (2025.00, 
4.7731), (2026.00, 4.7456), (2027.00, 4.7181), (2028.00, 4.6906) 
 
IND_P2:_Public_Services = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 6.70), (2007.00, 6.70), (2008.00, 6.70), (2009.00, 7.00), (2010.00, 7.20), 
(2011.00, 7.20), (2012.00, 6.90), (2013.00, 6.70), (2014.00, 7.00), (2015.00, 7.50), 
(2016.00, 7.60), (2017.00, 7.40), (2018.00, 7.10), (2019.00, 7.4424), (2020.00, 7.4979), 
(2021.00, 7.5534), (2022.00, 7.6089), (2023.00, 7.6644), (2024.00, 7.7199), (2025.00, 




IND_P3:_Human_Rights = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 5.40), (2007.00, 5.40), (2008.00, 6.00), (2009.00, 6.00), (2010.00, 6.10), 
(2011.00, 5.90), (2012.00, 5.80), (2013.00, 5.90), (2014.00, 5.60), (2015.00, 5.90), 
(2016.00, 6.20), (2017.00, 6.00), (2018.00, 5.80), (2019.00, 6.0343), (2020.00, 6.0612), 
(2021.00, 6.0881), (2022.00, 6.115), (2023.00, 6.1419), (2024.00, 6.1688), (2025.00, 
6.1957), (2026.00, 6.2226), (2027.00, 6.2495), (2028.00, 6.2764) 
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IND_Perceived_Prosperity = India_Prosperity 
IND_Perceived_Security = India_Security 
 
IND_Polity = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 9.0), (2007.00, 9.0), (2008.00, 9.0), (2009.00, 9.0), (2010.00, 9.0), (2011.00, 
9.0), (2012.00, 9.0), (2013.00, 9.0), (2014.00, 9.0), (2015.00, 9.0), (2016.00, 9.0), 
(2017.00, 9.0), (2018.00, 9.0), (2019.00, 9.0), (2020.00, 9.0), (2021.00, 9.0), (2022.00, 
9.0), (2023.00, 9.0), (2024.00, 9.0), (2025.00, 9.0), (2026.00, 9.0), (2027.00, 9.0), 
(2028.00, 9.0) 
 
IND_Population = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 1129.38), (2007.00, 1147.591), (2008.00, 1165.254), (2009.00, 1180.81), 
(2010.00, 1199.868), (2011.00, 1220.581), (2012.00, 1238.754), (2013.00, 1256.299), 
(2014.00, 1273.296), (2015.00, 1285.039), (2016.00, 1307.371), (2017.00, 1325.132), 
(2018.00, 1342.893), (2019.00, 1360.654), (2020.00, 1378.415), (2021.00, 1396.176), 
(2022.00, 1413.937), (2023.00, 1431.698), (2024.00, 1449.459), (2025.00, 1467.22), 
(2026.00, 1484.981), (2027.00, 1502.742), (2028.00, 1520.503) 
 
IND_Rate_of_Prosperity_Change = IF(Prosperity_Parity < 10)THEN(0)ELSE(0) 
IND_Rate_of_Security_Change = IF(Security_Parity < 10)THEN(0)ELSE(0) 
 
IND_S1:_Demo_Pressure = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.80), (2007.00, 8.30), (2008.00, 8.00), (2009.00, 8.30), (2010.00, 8.10), 
(2011.00, 8.00), (2012.00, 7.30), (2013.00, 7.50), (2014.00, 7.70), (2015.00, 8.00), 
(2016.00, 8.10), (2017.00, 7.90), (2018.00, 8.00), (2019.00, 7.6686), (2020.00, 7.6213), 
(2021.00, 7.574), (2022.00, 7.5267), (2023.00, 7.4794), (2024.00, 7.4321), (2025.00, 
7.3848), (2026.00, 7.3375), (2027.00, 7.2902), (2028.00, 7.2429) 
 
“IND_S2:_Refugees_/_IDPs” = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 2.80), (2007.00, 3.20), (2008.00, 3.20), (2009.00, 4.90), (2010.00, 5.20), 
(2011.00, 5.00), (2012.00, 5.50), (2013.00, 5.20), (2014.00, 5.10), (2015.00, 5.40), 
(2016.00, 5.50), (2017.00, 5.30), (2018.00, 5.00), (2019.00, 6.0383), (2020.00, 6.2273), 
(2021.00, 6.4163), (2022.00, 6.6053), (2023.00, 6.7943), (2024.00, 6.9833), (2025.00, 
7.1723), (2026.00, 7.3613), (2027.00, 7.5503), (2028.00, 7.7393) 
 
PAK_C1:_Security_App = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 9.10), (2007.00, 9.50), (2008.00, 9.60), (2009.00, 9.50), (2010.00, 9.70), 
(2011.00, 9.40), (2012.00, 9.30), (2013.00, 9.80), (2014.00, 9.90), (2015.00, 9.60), 
(2016.00, 9.30), (2017.00, 9.10), (2018.00, 8.80), (2019.00, 9.2812), (2020.00, 9.2598), 
(2021.00, 9.2384), (2022.00, 9.217), (2023.00, 9.1956), (2024.00, 9.1742), (2025.00, 
9.1528), (2026.00, 9.1314), (2027.00, 9.11), (2028.00, 9.0886) 
 
 
PAK_C2:_Fact_Elites = GRAPH(TIME) 
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(2006.00, 9.10), (2007.00, 9.50), (2008.00, 9.80), (2009.00, 9.60), (2010.00, 9.50), 
(2011.00, 9.10), (2012.00, 9.10), (2013.00, 9.20), (2014.00, 9.50), (2015.00, 9.20), 
(2016.00, 8.90), (2017.00, 8.90), (2018.00, 8.90), (2019.00, 8.9116), (2020.00, 8.8627), 
(2021.00, 8.8138), (2022.00, 8.7649), (2023.00, 8.716), (2024.00, 8.6671), (2025.00, 
8.6182), (2026.00, 8.5693), (2027.00, 8.5204), (2028.00, 8.4715) 
 
PAK_C3:_Group_Grieve = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.6), (2007.00, 9.0), (2008.00, 9.5), (2009.00, 9.6), (2010.00, 9.4), (2011.00, 
9.3), (2012.00, 9.6), (2013.00, 9.7), (2014.00, 10.0), (2015.00, 10.0), (2016.00, 9.7), 
(2017.00, 10.0), (2018.00, 9.7), (2019.00, 10.0), (2020.00, 10.0), (2021.00, 10.0), 
(2022.00, 10.0), (2023.00, 10.0), (2024.00, 10.0), (2025.00, 10.0), (2026.00, 10.0), 
(2027.00, 10.0), (2028.00, 10.0) 
 
PAK_Defense_%_GDP = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 3.645255), (2007.00, 3.511986), (2008.00, 3.459371), (2009.00, 3.265224), 
(2010.00, 3.423691), (2011.00, 3.285651), (2012.00, 3.484399), (2013.00, 3.470973), 
(2014.00, 3.476579), (2015.00, 3.551387), (2016.00, 3.4405), (2017.00, 3.4374), (2018.00, 
3.4343), (2019.00, 3.4312), (2020.00, 3.4281), (2021.00, 3.425), (2022.00, 3.4219), 
(2023.00, 3.4188), (2024.00, 3.4157), (2025.00, 3.4126), (2026.00, 3.4095), (2027.00, 
3.4064), (2028.00, 3.4033) 
 
PAK_Defense_Spending = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 5003625331), (2007.00, 5351765175), (2008.00, 5883622585), (2009.00, 
5490564763), (2010.00, 6073862464), (2011.00, 7017736584), (2012.00, 7818420131), 
(2013.00, 8025532898), (2014.00, 8495400418), (2015.00, 9608495773), (2016.00, 
9.5e+09), (2017.00, 1e+10), (2018.00, 1.05e+10), (2019.00, 1.1e+10), (2020.00, 
1.15e+10), (2021.00, 1.2e+10), (2022.00, 1.25e+10), (2023.00, 1.3e+10), (2024.00, 
1.35e+10), (2025.00, 1.4e+10), (2026.00, 1.45e+10), (2027.00, 1.5e+10), (2028.00, 
1.55e+10) 
 
PAK_E1:_Econ_Declin = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 7.0), (2006.77272727, 5.8), (2007.54545455, 6.2), (2008.31818182, 6.4), 
(2009.09090909, 6.2), (2009.86363636, 6.6), (2010.63636364, 7.2), (2011.40909091, 7.5), 
(2012.18181818, 7.5), (2012.95454545, 7.7), (2013.72727273, 7.4), (2014.50, 6.9), 
(2015.27272727, 6.6), (2016.04545455, 7.4351), (2016.81818182, 7.5192), 
(2017.59090909, 7.6033), (2018.36363636, 7.6874), (2019.13636364, 7.7715), 
(2019.90909091, 7.8556), (2020.68181818, 7.9397), (2021.45454545, 8.0238), 
(2022.22727273, 8.1079), (2023.00, 8.192) 
 
PAK_E2:_Econ_Inequality = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.90), (2007.00, 8.50), (2008.00, 8.80), (2009.00, 8.80), (2010.00, 8.40), 
(2011.00, 8.50), (2012.00, 8.20), (2013.00, 7.90), (2014.00, 7.60), (2015.00, 7.30), 
(2016.00, 7.00), (2017.00, 6.50), (2018.00, 6.20), (2019.00, 6.3504), (2020.00, 6.1301), 
(2021.00, 5.9098), (2022.00, 5.6895), (2023.00, 5.4692), (2024.00, 5.2489), (2025.00, 
5.0286), (2026.00, 4.8083), (2027.00, 4.588), (2028.00, 4.3677) 
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PAK_E3:_Brain_Drain = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.10), (2007.00, 8.10), (2008.00, 8.10), (2009.00, 8.30), (2010.00, 7.90), 
(2011.00, 7.50), (2012.00, 7.20), (2013.00, 6.90), (2014.00, 6.90), (2015.00, 7.00), 
(2016.00, 7.30), (2017.00, 7.20), (2018.00, 7.10), (2019.00, 6.7306), (2020.00, 6.6196), 
(2021.00, 6.5086), (2022.00, 6.3976), (2023.00, 6.2866), (2024.00, 6.1756), (2025.00, 
6.0646), (2026.00, 5.9536), (2027.00, 5.8426), (2028.00, 5.7316) 
 
PAK_GDP = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 137264000000.0), (2007.00, 152386000000.0), (2008.00, 170078000000.0), 
(2009.00, 168153000000.0), (2010.00, 177407000000.0), (2011.00, 213587000000.0), 
(2012.00, 224384000000.0), (2013.00, 231219000000.0), (2014.00, 244361000000.0), 
(2015.00, 270556000000.0), (2016.00, 278655000000.0), (2017.00, 304952000000.0), 
(2018.00, 230000000000.0), (2019.00, 240000000000.0), (2020.00, 250000000000.0), 
(2021.00, 260000000000.0), (2022.00, 270000000000.0), (2023.00, 280000000000.0), 
(2024.00, 290000000000.0), (2025.00, 300000000000.0), (2026.00, 310000000000.0), 
(2027.00, 320000000000.0), (2028.00, 330000000000.0) 
 
PAK_Growth_% = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 5.818), (2007.00, 5.537), (2008.00, 4.988), (2009.00, 0.361), (2010.00, 2.581), 
(2011.00, 3.624), (2012.00, 3.837), (2013.00, 3.683), (2014.00, 4.053), (2015.00, 4.058), 
(2016.00, 4.563), (2017.00, 5.373), (2018.00, 5.227), (2019.00, 2.905), (2020.00, 2.813), 
(2021.00, 2.781), (2022.00, 2.7), (2023.00, 2.62), (2024.00, 2.54), (2025.00, 2.8454), 
(2026.00, 2.7612), (2027.00, 2.677), (2028.00, 2.5928) 
 
PAK_Imports = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 21422766419.0), (2007.00, 29577339842.0), (2008.00, 30135517579.0), 
(2009.00, 39478276163.0), (2010.00, 33085901223.0), (2011.00, 34332943126.0), 
(2012.00, 40524442876.0), (2013.00, 45794092923.0), (2014.00, 46374225335.0), 
(2015.00, 45594469822.0), (2016.00, 46130526984.0), (2017.00, 45000000000.0), 
(2018.00, 53527248788.0), (2019.00, 48000000000.0), (2020.00, 50000000000.0), 
(2021.00, 52000000000.0), (2022.00, 54000000000.0), (2023.00, 56000000000.0), 
(2024.00, 58000000000.0), (2025.00, 60000000000.0), (2026.00, 62000000000.0), 
(2027.00, 64000000000.0), (2028.00, 66000000000.0) 
 
PAK_P1:_State_Legit = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.50), (2007.00, 8.70), (2008.00, 9.50), (2009.00, 9.10), (2010.00, 8.90), 
(2011.00, 8.60), (2012.00, 8.30), (2013.00, 8.40), (2014.00, 8.50), (2015.00, 8.60), 
(2016.00, 8.30), (2017.00, 8.10), (2018.00, 7.80), (2019.00, 8.0034), (2020.00, 7.9237), 
(2021.00, 7.844), (2022.00, 7.7643), (2023.00, 7.6846), (2024.00, 7.6049), (2025.00, 
7.5252), (2026.00, 7.4455), (2027.00, 7.3658), (2028.00, 7.2861) 
 
PAK_P2:_Public_Services = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 7.50), (2007.00, 7.10), (2008.00, 7.10), (2009.00, 7.50), (2010.00, 7.30), 
(2011.00, 7.30), (2012.00, 7.00), (2013.00, 7.30), (2014.00, 7.60), (2015.00, 7.90), 
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(2016.00, 8.20), (2017.00, 7.70), (2018.00, 7.90), (2019.00, 7.938), (2020.00, 8.0017), 
(2021.00, 8.0654), (2022.00, 8.1291), (2023.00, 8.1928), (2024.00, 8.2565), (2025.00, 
8.3202), (2026.00, 8.3839), (2027.00, 8.4476), (2028.00, 8.5113) 
 
PAK_P3:_Human_Right = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 8.50), (2007.00, 8.70), (2008.00, 9.50), (2009.00, 8.90), (2010.00, 8.90), 
(2011.00, 8.70), (2012.00, 8.60), (2013.00, 8.70), (2014.00, 8.60), (2015.00, 8.40), 
(2016.00, 8.20), (2017.00, 8.00), (2018.00, 7.70), (2019.00, 7.938), (2020.00, 8.0017), 
(2021.00, 8.0654), (2022.00, 8.1291), (2023.00, 8.1928), (2024.00, 8.2565), (2025.00, 
8.3202), (2026.00, 8.3839), (2027.00, 8.4476), (2028.00, 8.5113) 
 
PAK_Perceived_Prosperity = Pakistan_Prosperity 
PAK_Perceived_Security = Pakistan_Security 
 
PAK_Polity = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, -5.0), (2007.00, 2.0), (2008.00, 5.0), (2009.00, 5.0), (2010.00, 6.0), (2011.00, 
6.0), (2012.00, 6.0), (2013.00, 7.0), (2014.00, 7.0), (2015.00, 7.0), (2016.00, 9.8005), 
(2017.00, 10.0), (2018.00, 10.0), (2019.00, 10.0), (2020.00, 10.0), (2021.00, 10.0), 
(2022.00, 10.0), (2023.00, 10.0), (2024.00, 10.0), (2025.00, 10.0), (2026.00, 10.0), 
(2027.00, 10.0), (2028.00, 10.0) 
 
PAK_Population = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 161.86), (2007.00, 164.98), (2008.00, 168.16), (2009.00, 171.07), (2010.00, 
173.76), (2011.00, 175.51), (2012.00, 178.19), (2013.00, 180.67), (2014.00, 183.67), 
(2015.00, 186.44), (2016.00, 189.0208), (2017.00, 191.6736), (2018.00, 194.3264), 
(2019.00, 196.9792), (2020.00, 199.632), (2021.00, 202.2848), (2022.00, 204.9376), 
(2023.00, 207.5904), (2024.00, 210.2432), (2025.00, 212.896), (2026.00, 215.5488), 
(2027.00, 218.2016), (2028.00, 220.8544) 
 
PAK_Rate_of_Prosperity_Change = IF(Prosperity_Parity >10 )THEN(0)ELSE(0) 
PAK_Rate_of_Security_Change = IF(Security_Parity >10)THEN(0)ELSE(0) 
 
PAK_S1:_Demo_Pressure = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 9.30), (2007.00, 8.20), (2008.00, 8.00), (2009.00, 8.30), (2010.00, 8.10), 
(2011.00, 8.80), (2012.00, 8.50), (2013.00, 8.90), (2014.00, 8.80), (2015.00, 9.00), 
(2016.00, 8.90), (2017.00, 8.40), (2018.00, 8.10), (2019.00, 8.6001), (2020.00, 8.6056), 
(2021.00, 8.6111), (2022.00, 8.6166), (2023.00, 8.6221), (2024.00, 8.6276), (2025.00, 
8.6331), (2026.00, 8.6386), (2027.00, 8.6441), (2028.00, 8.6496) 
 
“PAK_S2:_Refugees_/_IDPs” = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2006.00, 9.30), (2007.00, 8.50), (2008.00, 8.60), (2009.00, 8.60), (2010.00, 8.90), 
(2011.00, 9.20), (2012.00, 9.00), (2013.00, 9.10), (2014.00, 8.80), (2015.00, 8.90), 
(2016.00, 8.90), (2017.00, 8.70), (2018.00, 8.40), (2019.00, 8.7383), (2020.00, 8.724), 
(2021.00, 8.7097), (2022.00, 8.6954), (2023.00, 8.6811), (2024.00, 8.6668), (2025.00, 
8.6525), (2026.00, 8.6382), (2027.00, 8.6239), (2028.00, 8.6096) 
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Prosperity_Parity = PAK_Perceived_Prosperity-IND_Perceived_Prosperity 
Security_Parity = PAK_Perceived_Security-IND_Perceived_Security 
 
{ The model has 68 (68) variables (array expansion in parens). 
In root model and 0 additional modules with 0 sectors. 
Stocks: 4 (4) Flows: 8 (8) Converters: 56 (56) 


















fsi_2006 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-2006.csv”) 
fsi_2007 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2007.csv”) 
fsi_2008 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2008.csv”) 
fsi_2009 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2009.csv”) 
fsi_2010 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2010.csv”) 
fsi_2011 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2011.csv”) 
fsi_2012 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2012.csv”) 
fsi_2013 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2013.csv”) 
fsi_2014 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2014.csv”) 
fsi_2015 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2015.csv”) 
fsi_2016 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2016.csv”) 
fsi_2017 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2017.csv”) 
fsi_2018 <- read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/fsi-
2018.csv”) 
## Bind all the data into one data.frame 
 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_2006, fsi_2007) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2008) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2009) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2010) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2011) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2012) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2013) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2014) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2015) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2016) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2017) 
fsi_all = rbind(fsi_all, fsi_2018) 
 
## Delete all NA in fsi_all 
fsi_all = na.omit(fsi_all) 
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## Change “Rank” to a numeric value 
fsi_all$Rank = gsub(“st,” “,” fsi_all$Rank) 
fsi_all$Rank = gsub(“nd,” “,” fsi_all$Rank) 
fsi_all$Rank = gsub(“rd,” “,” fsi_all$Rank) 
fsi_all$Rank = gsub(“th,” “,” fsi_all$Rank) 
fsi_all$Rank = gsub(“n/r,” “3,” fsi_all$Rank) ### One rank in Sudan in 2012 is ranked n/r but is actually 3rd 
 
fsi_all$Rank = as.numeric(fsi_all$Rank) 
fsi_all$Total = as.numeric(fsi_all$Total) 
fsi_all$C1 = as.numeric(fsi_all$C1) 
fsi_all$C2 = as.numeric(fsi_all$C2) 
fsi_all$C3 = as.numeric(fsi_all$C3) 
fsi_all$E1 = as.numeric(fsi_all$E1) 
fsi_all$E2 = as.numeric(fsi_all$E2) 
fsi_all$E3 = as.numeric(fsi_all$E3) 
fsi_all$P1 = as.numeric(fsi_all$P1) 
fsi_all$P2 = as.numeric(fsi_all$P2) 
fsi_all$P3 = as.numeric(fsi_all$P3) 
fsi_all$S1 = as.numeric(fsi_all$S1) 
fsi_all$S2 = as.numeric(fsi_all$S2) 
fsi_all$X1 = as.numeric(fsi_all$X1) 
 
fsi_all$Cohesion = (fsi_all$C1 + fsi_all$C2 +fsi_all$C3) 
fsi_all$Political = (fsi_all$P1 + fsi_all$P2 + fsi_all$P3) 
fsi_all$Social = (fsi_all$S1 + fsi_all$S2) 
fsi_all$Economic = (fsi_all$E1 + fsi_all$E2 + fsi_all$E3) 
fsi_all$External = (fsi_all$X1) 
 
fsi_all$Prosperity = (fsi_all$Economic + fsi_all$P2 + fsi_all$Social +fsi_all$C2 + fsi_all$C3) 
fsi_all$Security = (fsi_all$C1 + fsi_all$P1 + +fsi_all$P3 + fsi_all$Social + fsi_all$C2 + fsi_all$C3) 
 
## Pol data 
pol = read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/p4v2015.csv”) 
pol = pol [pol$year > 2005, ] 





## Dev Data 
dev = read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/
dev_1945_2015_v40.csv”) 
dev = dev [dev$year > 2005, ] 






dev [946:955,1] = “Cote d’Ivore” 
dev [856:865,1] =“Sao Tome and Principe” 
 
 
## Growth by % of GDP 
g = read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/WEOAPR2019all.csv”) 
g = g [g$`WEO Subject Code` == ‘NGDP_RPCH’,] 
g = cbind(g [,4],g [,35:52]) 
g = g [-195:-196,] 
g = g [,-16:-19] 
g [42,1] = “Cote d’Ivore” 
g [147,1] =“Sao Tome and Principe” 
g = d_gather(g, .value = “g,” .key = “Year,” .by = ‘Country’) 




## GDP  
gdp = read_files(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/
API_NY.GDP.MKTP.CD_DS2_en_csv_v2_10576830.csv”) 
gdp = gdp [,-2:-50] 
gdp = gdp [,-14:-15] 
names(gdp)[1] = ‘Country’ 
gdp = d_gather(gdp, .value = “gdp,” .key = “Year,” .by = ‘Country’) 
gdp$gdp = as.numeric(gdp$gdp) 
gdp$Year = substr(x = gdp$Year, start = 2, stop = 5) 
 
## Imports 
imp = read_csv(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/Imports of Goods and 
Services from World Bank.csv”) 
imp = imp [-1:-3,] 
colnames(imp) = imp [1, ] 
imp = imp [-1,] 
imp = imp [,-2:-50] 
imp = imp [,-14] 
imp [192,1] = ‘North Korea’ 
names(imp)[1] = ‘Country’ 
imp = d_gather(imp, .value = “imp,” .key = “Year,” .by = ‘Country’) 
 
## Defense Spending 
DefG = read_files(“/Users/davidhermann/OneDrive/Documents/NPS/4th QTR/DA 3450/
API_MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS_DS2_en_excel_v2_44712.csv”) 
DefG = DefG[-1:-2,] 
colnames(DefG) = DefG[1, ] 
DefG = DefG[-1,] 
DefG = DefG[,-2:-50] 
names(DefG)[1] = ‘Country’ 
DefG = d_gather(DefG, .value = “DefG,” .key = “Year,” .by = ‘Country’) 
 
 
## Merge All Data Sets 
 
dp1 = NA 
dp1 = magic_merge(pol, dev, all = FALSE) 
dp1 = magic_merge(dp1, imp, all = FALSE) 
dp1 = magic_merge(dp1, fsi_all,all = FALSE) 
dp1 = magic_merge(dp1, g,all = FALSE) 
dp1 = magic_merge(dp1, gdp,all = FALSE) 
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dp1 = magic_merge(dp1, DefG,all = FALSE) 
dp1$DefSpend = dp1$gdp*(dp1$DefG/100) 
 
## Regression Analysis 
 




## lm(formula = Prosperity ~ X1, data = dp1) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##      Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
## -29.2636  -4.6161  -0.1879   4.5063  30.6368  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept) 14.26270    0.49338   28.91   <2e-16 *** 
## X1           5.74299    0.07899   72.71   <2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 7.32 on 1624 degrees of freedom 
##   (37 observations deleted due to missingness) 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.765,  Adjusted R-squared:  0.7648  
## F-statistic:  5286 on 1 and 1624 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
 





## lm(formula = Security ~ X1, data = dp1) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##     Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
## -26.117  -5.344  -0.366   4.746  33.327  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept) 10.22991    0.51944   19.69   <2e-16 *** 
## X1           5.46955    0.08316   65.77   <2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 7.707 on 1624 degrees of freedom 
##   (37 observations deleted due to missingness) 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.727,  Adjusted R-squared:  0.7269  
## F-statistic:  4326 on 1 and 1624 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
 




## lm(formula = Prosperity ~ Security, data = dp1) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##      Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
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## -14.3864  -2.3363   0.1521   2.4405  12.4078  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept) 6.120173   0.295211   20.73   <2e-16 *** 
## Security    0.988112   0.006633  148.98   <2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 3.943 on 1624 degrees of freedom 
##   (37 observations deleted due to missingness) 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.9318, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9318  
## F-statistic: 2.219e+04 on 1 and 1624 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 
 




## lm(formula = Security ~ Prosperity, data = dp1) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##      Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max  
## -12.1098  -2.3629  -0.2901   2.3554  13.7647  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept) -2.90809    0.31619  -9.197   <2e-16 *** 
## Prosperity   0.94303    0.00633 148.979   <2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 3.852 on 1624 degrees of freedom 
##   (37 observations deleted due to missingness) 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.9318, Adjusted R-squared:  0.9318  
## F-statistic: 2.219e+04 on 1 and 1624 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 




## lm(formula = Prosperity ~ Dem + Pop + imp + g + gdp, data = dp1) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##     Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
## -34.644  -7.455   1.475   7.908  37.643  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  5.185e+01  4.528e-01 114.501  < 2e-16 *** 
## Dem         -7.153e-01  5.137e-02 -13.926  < 2e-16 *** 
## Pop          2.650e-02  2.374e-03  11.161  < 2e-16 *** 
## imp         -5.803e-11  3.036e-12 -19.113  < 2e-16 *** 
## g            1.694e-01  5.065e-02   3.345 0.000842 *** 
## gdp          7.382e-12  5.823e-13  12.677  < 2e-16 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 11.9 on 1512 degrees of freedom 
##   (145 observations deleted due to missingness) 
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## Multiple R-squared:  0.3847, Adjusted R-squared:  0.3827  
## F-statistic: 189.1 on 5 and 1512 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 




## lm(formula = Security ~ Dem + Pop + DefG + DefSpend, data = dp1) 
##  
## Residuals: 
##     Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
## -31.123  -9.234   1.211   9.252  28.087  
##  
## Coefficients: 
##               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
## (Intercept)  4.499e+01  7.110e-01  63.275  < 2e-16 *** 
## Dem         -1.221e+00  6.214e-02 -19.651  < 2e-16 *** 
## Pop          1.122e-02  2.261e-03   4.965  7.7e-07 *** 
## DefG         4.775e-01  2.303e-01   2.073   0.0384 *   
## DefSpend    -4.144e-11  6.474e-12  -6.400  2.1e-10 *** 
## --- 
## Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ‘ 1 
##  
## Residual standard error: 12.34 on 1414 degrees of freedom 
##   (244 observations deleted due to missingness) 
## Multiple R-squared:  0.3009, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2989  
## F-statistic: 152.1 on 4 and 1414 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16 
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